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Sovereignty is the power exercised by a state1 over its people and its ter-
ritory. It includes the authority to exclude people from a territory, to regulate
domestic relations, to regulate land use and ownership and, generally, to
create and enforce laws. Canada and the United States exercise sovereignty as
a matter of course; but for Indians, sovereignty is much more tenuously defin-
ed. Before coming under the sway of European colonists, Indian tribes were
sovereign states, many with well-developed governments. 2 After centuries of
European contact and then domination, Indians have been left with what has
been described as "sovereignty-at-sufferance." 3 That is, tribes have retained
whatever degree of control over their people and territory Parliament or Con-
gress permits. Indians are increasingly asserting their sovereign right, arguing
that the respective federal legislatures had no authority to extinguish Indian
sovereign rights. 4 This paper examines this claim and explores what remains of
Indian sovereignty by comparing the Indian policies of Canada and the United
States. As will be argued, both the United States and Canada have followed
fairly consistent policies of assimilation and separation (with an option to
assimilate) respectively, but have followed divergent courses to effect these
ends. Canada has pursued the practice of isolating Indians on separate tracts
of land known as reserves with strong legislative incentives5 and, in the pro-
cess, has exerted a paternalistic control over Indian life through its Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs (DIA). Hence Indians have only the slightest residual
governmental powers. 6 The United States policy, on the other hand, has walk-
' American Legal Institution Publishers, Restatement of the Law Second, Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (St. Paul, Minn.: n. pub., 1965) at 14, s.4 defines"state" as "an entity that has defined territory and population under the control of a
government and that engages in foreign relations."
2 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 at 559-60 (1832); see text accompanying notes
17-20 and 201-208, infra.
3 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 at 323 (1978). For federal statutory limita-
tions on Indian sovereignty, see R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6; 25 U.S.C. §50a-450n., §461-79
(1976).
4 Indian governments traditionally exercised the powers of sovereign nations and
the most fundamental right of a sovereign nation is the right to govern its
people and territory under its own law and customs....
Indian tribes and subsequently Indian bands are qualified to exercise powers of
self-government because they are independent political groups. Among the in-
herent powers of Indian government is the power to:
a) determine the form of government;
b) define conditions for membership in the nation;
c) regulate the domestic relations of its members;
d) levy and collect taxes;
e) administer and enforce laws.
Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, Indian Government (Prince Albert, Sask.: n.
pub., 1977) at 55, reprinted in Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada (1978), 27 Buffalo L.
Rev. 581 at 592-93. See also Proposal of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians for the Revi-
sion of the Indian Act, 2 August 1979, [1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 1; The Indian Tribes of
Manitoba, Wahbung: Our Tomorrows (Manitoba: Copyright Manitoba Indian
Brotherhood Inc., 1971) at 1-4 [hereinafter Wahbung].
5 See text accompanying notes 39-50, infra.
6 lndian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6 ss. 39, 66, 81. With recent administrative policy
changes, the Dominion government has given Indians some powers of self-government.
See text accompanying notes 77-81, infra.
1983]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
ed a crooked path between instant assimilation and tribal self-government on a
United States-designed model. 7 While the United States Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (BIA) has played the same paternalistic role as Canada's DIA, Congress
and the courts have limited the BIA's extensive power during the last fifty
years.8 Legislation designed to foster Indian self-government along with
judicially created doctrines have shielded Indians from some BIA and state
assertions of power, leaving tribes with a theoretical sovereignty and some self-
governing powers. 9
Given the common cultural beginnings of the United States and Canada and
the cultural similarities of Indians that the countries dealt with, 10 one would
expect similar Indian policies and practices to develop. The countries both
have federal systems with a fairly similar division of authority between federal
and provincial or state governments." Both constitutions vested primary
authority over Indian affairs in the federal legislatures, 12 and similarly, both
federal legislatures have the implicit power to delegate this authority to ad-
ministrative agencies. 13 Also, the constitutions vested the authority to give ef-
fect to treaties in the federal legislatures, impliedly in Canada, expressly in the
United States. 14
The two nations have a specific constitutional difference regarding In-
dians, however. Canada's constitution vests exclusive legislative jurisdiction
over "Indians and lands reserved for Indians" in the Dominion Parliament;
7 See the Indian Reorganizaton Act of 1934, c. 576, 48 Stat. 984, codified at 25
U.S.C. §461-79 (1976) and the General Allotment (or Dawes) Act of 1887, c. 119, 24
Stat. 388 (repealed in part by the Indian Reorgdnization Act of 1934).
8 See the Indian Self-Determination andEducation Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat.
2203 codified at 25 U.S.C. §450a-450n. (1976); the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
supra note 7.
9E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S. Ct:
1257 (1973); Scholder v. United States, 428 F. 2d. 1123 (9th. Cir. 1970); The Cree Na-
tion v. United States, 78 Ct. CI. 474 (1933). See also Seminole Nation v. United States,
416 U.S. 286, 62 S. Ct. 1040 (1942) (Judicial doctrine of United States trusteeship of In-
dians invoked to require the BIA to compensate Indians if it knowingly permitted
misappropriation of tribal funds by tribal officers.).
10 This is not to imply the United States encountered only Indian cultures similar to
those in Canada. The Pueblos of the American Southwest, with their individualistic
farm culture, for instance, do not have an analog in Canada. But this paper necessarily
paints with a broad brush, and the majority of Indians in the various regions shared by
the United States and Canada lived similarly according to region.
" There are, of course, marked differences between the two constitutions' separa-
tion of national and state power. For instance, the Canadian Parliament is expressly em-
powered to make criminal laws (The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict.,
c. 3 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1970, Appendix V, s. 91 (27)) [hereinafter the BNA Act], while
the United States Congress, to justify a criminal statute, must peg it to an enumerated
power through the necessary and proper clause of Article I, s. 8. Many basic federal
powers are the same, including those over shipping, currency, defence, navigation,
aliens, and Indians. Compare the BNA Act, s. 91 with the U.S. Const. art. I, s. 8.
'2 TheBNA Act, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix V, s. 91(24); U.S. Const. art. 1, s. 8 cl. 3.
1 3 Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada (Toronto: The Carswell Co. Ltd., 1977) at
216-17; Yackus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944); Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349 (1904).
14Francis v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 618, 3 D.L.R. (2d) 641, 56 D.T.C. 1077;
U.S. Const. art. 11, s. 2. cl. 2.
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the United States Constitution limits Congress' power to the regulation of
"commerce... with the Indian tribes," granting no explicit authority to other
branches of government. This difference, however, has meant little in practice.
As the nations' powers increased their leaders found ways to justify ever-
greater involvement in Indian culture and self-government. Canada looked to
the explicit language of its Constitution; the United States built a theoretical
structure on the Indian Commerce Clause and on the Senate's treaty-ratifying
powers. 1 5 Despite some constitutional differences, the two countries' justifica-
tions for and means of reducing Indian sovereignty were very similar.
To demonstrate the respective policies of the United States and Canada,
this paper looks at the laws relating to Indian self-government, both legislative
and judicial, and land use. The remarks here are limited to these aspects of
sovereignty as they apply to Indian reserves or reservations created by treaty. 16
The paper discusses both the historical development and the current division
of authority between the respective federal, provincial or state and Indian
governments. By looking at the vestiges of Indian sovereignty, the paper pro-
vides an introduction and background to Indian law issues that are central to
Indian control of their communities.
II. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
A. Introduction
When Europe first made contact with the North American Indians they
were using a wide range of governmental systems. The simplest system placed
major decision-making in one elder member of the band, with other decisions
made according to band consensus. Many small, nomadic bands consisting of
one to several extended families, used this method. 17 At the other extreme, the
Iroquois, or Six Nations Confederacy, had a relatively complex governmental
system in which women elders from each tribe chose chiefs from a few
families. These nominees were in turn confirmed by the existing council of
chiefs. '8 The women elders reserved the power to oust chiefs for incompetence.
The chiefs, who could not hold a military position, met in councils at the
"federal" and tribal levels to make major decisions and resolve disputes in-
volving more than one tribe; these councils exercised executive, judicial, and
legislative functions with some separation of powers.' 9 Dispute resolution
within bands was performed by chiefs, consensually by the band as a whole or
by negotiation between transgressor and aggrieved party or parties.
20
11 See text accompanying notes 369-75, infra.
16 This paper does not deal with the pecularities of Indian country in the United
States involving the legal distinctions between treaty reservations, executive order reser-
vations and allotted Indian lands. It also does not deal with activities that are exercised
independently of reservation boundaries such as hunting and fishing and domestic rela-
tions.
17 See Oswalt, This Land Was Theirs: A Study of the North American Indian (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966) at 33-35; see generally Hodge, ed., 1 Handbook of
American Indians North of Mexico (reprint 1907-10 ed. Washington, D.C.: Smith-
sonian Inst., Bureau of American Ethnology, 1975).
18 Id. at 617.
19Id. at 337.20Id. at 616; Wahbung, supra note4, at 3.
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B. Dominion Powers Over Indian Government
Early Crown documents and agreements with Indians dealt with Indian
land rights and alliances against competing European powers in North
America. The first major document regarding Indian-European relations was
the Royal Proclamation of 176321 which acknowledged Indians' rights to oc-
cupy lands that they inhabited and required that the Crown be the sole pur-
chaser of Indian rights and land. Further, the Proclamation ordered whites
settled on Indian lands which were not properly purchased by the Crown to
leave.
The Proclamation acknowledged Indian title to land, albeit limiting it to
"use", and required that the Crown make agreements with Indians if lands
were to be opened for settlement. Thus the Proclamation set the stage for
Crown-Indian treaties which are at the base of the Dominion-Indian relation-
ship. The earliest treaties dealt almost solely with land rights, making no men-
tion of Indian government.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century the pressure to open
western lands to settlement and northern lands to development led the Crown
to prepare treaty drafts which would extinguish Indian title to huge tracts of
central, western and northern Canada. These treaties, agreed to during the
first decades of Confederation, would become known as the "numbered
treaties". 22 The Crown representatives usually told Indians that no negotiation
was possible over these treaties, they could either sign and secure a degree of
protection from the Crown or watch ever growing waves of settlers take their
land anyway. 23 The Indians, many weakened by disease and facing extermina-
tion of the buffalo by whites, generally signed after brief negotiations.
Under the treaties, 24 Indians ceded rights of possession in nearly all of the
land covered by treaty in exchange for the promise of annuities, goods, farm
implements, and protection of Indian game rights in the ceded areas. In
return, the Indians retained small areas of land known as reserves and promis-
ed to maintain "peace and good order" between themselves and whites. The
Crown promised to prevent trespassers and alcohol from entering the reserves.
The government retained veto power over Indian reserve land sale and the
power to regulate hunting and fishing in the ceded lands.
The treaties do not indicate either Crown or Indian intent that Indian
powers of self-government should be surrendered to the Crown. 25 It is true
that the Crown negotiators saw "civilizing" Indians as a goal of treaty-making
and, as Alexander Morris, one of the chief Crown negotiators wrote:
21 The Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix I.
2-Indian Treaties and Surrenders (Ottawa: C.H. Parmalee, Printer to the King,
1912).
23 Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and North-west
Territories (Toronto: Willing and Williamson, 1880) at 34.
24 Supra note 22, at 35. Treaties do not speak of a change in land title because the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognized only Indian's perpetual usuafructory right in
the lands they occupied. See, St. Catherine's Building andLumber v. The Queen (1888),
14 A.C. 46 (P.C.).
21 See text accompanying notes 83-87, infra as well as Morris, supra note 23.
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The Indians are fully aware that their old mode of life is passing away....
[TJhe Indians are tractable, docile and willing to learn. I think that advantage
should be taken of this disposition to teach them to become self-supporting, which
can best be accomplished by the aid of a few practical farmers and carpenters to in-
struct them in farming and house-building.
26
Morris, expressing the mood of his people in that day, called upon the
churches to fulfill their duty to bring "Christianity and civilization to leaven
the mass of heathenism and paganism among the Indian tribes .. ."27 Even
so, Morris did not suggest that Indians should be deprived of self-government
nor did he give them to understand that this would happen during the negotia-
tions. The Crown, by entering into treaties with Indian leaders, did just the op-
posite. Indian leaders were authorized to act on the bands' behalf. This im-
plied that traditional leadership would be unaffected by the new bond between
nations.
Before discussing the Canadian assumption of Indian government, it is
important to look at the legal nature of Indian treaties in Canada, a matter
that is somewhat confused. Under one analysis, Indian treaties are interna-
tional in nature, 28 and have no effect on domestic law until formally im-
plemented by appropriate federal legislation. Technically, since the federal
legislature has not given explicit recognition to the treaties, they would, under
this analysis, have no legal effect.29 This analysis has been used to justify ig-
noring Indian treaties, but if carried to its logical end, it would wreak havoc,
for were Indian treaties truly of no effect, a cloud would lie upon title to most
of the land in Canada.
Canadian courts have avoided this troublesome aspect of treaty law by ac-
cepting that Indian treaties create enforceable obligations, although they may
not have been agreements between sovereign states. 30 This analysis views In-
dian treaties as contracts between the Crown and Indians which it is "the duty
and obligation of the Crown to carry oUt." ' 31 Judicial authority impliedly sup-
ports the contractual model for Indian treaties; where legislation appears to
26 Supra note 23, at 288-91.
27 Id. at 296.
28 Francis v. The Queen, supra note 14, at 621. For the legal nature of United States
Indian treaties see text accompanying notes 226-29, infra.
29 It is arguable that s. 88 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6 gives implicit
legislative recognition to Indian treaty provisions. Section 88 states: "Subject to the
terms of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, all laws of general
application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of
Indians in the province, except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this Act
or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made thereunder...." Under this section, In-
dian treaty provisions pre-empt conflicting provincial legislation.
See R. v. White and Bob (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d), 481n., [1965] S.C.R. vi. The
courts have interpreted s. 88 to permit federal legislation to overcome conflicting treaty
provisions. See, The Queen v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267.
30R. v. White and Bob (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 at 617, 52 W.W.R. 193 at 197
(B.C.C.A.), aff'd (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481n., [1965] S.C.R. vi.
3 1 R. v. Wesley, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 774 at 778 (Alta. S.C.); see, A-G Can. v. A.-G.
Ont. (Re Indian claims), [1897] A.C. 199 (P.C.).
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conflict with a treaty, the courts have resolved doubts in favour of Indians
32
expressing the maxim that agreements are to be interpreted as they were
understood by the parties. 
33
While courts enforce the treaties, the Canadian Parliament has not always
carried out the "obligation of the Crown." The language of the British North
America Act 34 certainly does not imply that treaty terms limit the Parliament's
legislative power over Indians. Shortly after passage of the British North
America Act, the Dominion Parliament gave the Governor-in-Council power
to impose electoral government on Indians and to control band funds 35 never
expressing any concern that it was violating treaties. What was important was
that the Governor:
[L]ead the Indian people by degrees to mingle with the white race in the ordinary
avocations of life. It was intended ... that intelligent and educated men, recogniz-
ed as chiefs, should carry out the wishes of the male members of the mature years
in each band, who should be fairly represented in the conduct of their internal af-
fairs.
Thus establishing a responsible, for an irresponsible system, this provision, by law
was designed to pave the way to the establishment of simple municipal institu-
tions. 36
Band council members were to be elected to three-year terms and were subject
to removal by the Governor for dishonesty, intemperance, or immorality. The
Bands were to elect one chief for approximately seventy status Indians.
Keeping in mind that many Indians did not have a republican form of
government, 37 this was a.drastic measure. Many bands used a democratic form
of government based on consensus of the entire band that was sharply limited
by electing representatives. Other bands relied on one elder or "thinkers" to
make decisions. Under the new elective scheme, only Indian males were to be
enfranchised, a measure particularly offensive to the matriarchal Iroquois.
The new policy was carried out by Indian Affairs Agents who were even-
tually assigned to every reserve. Indians were slow to adopt their new govern-
mental system. 38 In order to move things along, the Dominion appointed the
Indian Agents chairmen of the band councils, and divided the reserves into
constituencies. 39 The latter often ruled with an iron hand, passing band or-
dinances or acting more directly to destroy traditional Indian government as
32 See R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451, 113 D.L.R. (3d) 374, 5 W.W.R. 456,
but see Cardinalv. A.-G. Alberta, [1974] S.C.R. 695, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 553.
33 R. v. Taylor and Williams, [1980] 1 C.N.L.R. 83 (Ont. S.C.), R. v. Cooper
(1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 113 (B.C.S.C.).
34 TheBNA Act, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix V, s. 91(24).
35An Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians and the Better Management
of Indian Affairs, (1869), 32 Vict., c. 6.
36 Sessional Paper No. 3 (1871), Indian Affairs Branch 4-7, reprinted in Bartlett,
supra note 4, at 594.
37 See text accompanying notes 17-19, supra. The term republican is used here to
mean a representative government. At the time referred to, the Canadian gov't. was a
limited republic, denying the franchise to women and non-whites.
38 Indian Affairs Branch 1871 Annual Report, reprinted in Bartlett, supra note 4, at
595.
39 TheIndian AmendmentAct, 1884, S.C. 46 & 47 Vict., c. 28.
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well as other important aspects of Indian culture. 40 Apart from cultivating a
few malleable Indian leaders, 4' the Agents did virtually nothing to prepare In-
dians for participation in Canadian society.
Throughout this period, indeed to the present day, the DIA enjoyed a vir-
tually unlimited delegation of power over Indian affairs. 42 Until recently, the
government refused Indians an opportunity to influence Indian legislation. In
order for an Indian to vote in federal elections, the Indian had to give up In-
dian status and rights and sell his rights in reserve lands. 43 Once an Indian
gained some power to affect Indian policy, the policy no longer applied to
him. As a result, most Indians did not exercise this option.
The Indian Act of 195144 purported to give Indians more self-government.
It removed Indian Agents from the chairs of band councils and gave Indian
women the band franchise, but the Act consolidated power in the DIA. The
Governor-in-Council, through the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development (the Minister), continued to control the form of band govern-
ment, band council powers, band financial affairs, and land allocation and
use. 45 Bands had an advisory capacity in some areas but rarely could they pre-
vent or effect change. 46 The Act also gave the Governor-in-Council power to
regulate reserve game, health matters (including compulsory hospitalization),
traffic, pest control, amusements, residential conditions, and finances. 47 The
Governor-in-Council also had discretion to appoint a justice of the peace to
hear certain cases.
48
The Act left band councils a narrow field of control. Beyond the Gover-
nor's and Minister's powers, the council was permitted to regulate law and
order, nuisance, construction of roads, public works and buildings, zoning,
bees and poultry, merchants, trespass and matters ancilliary to those
enumerated. 49 These were powers in name only, for Parliament failed to super-
vise the DIA during the transition to partial tribal self-government. The Indian
Agents stepped down from the chairs of the councils but continued to
dominate them. 50
40 See Wahbung, supra note 4, at 159 and Dept. of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, Indian Conditions: A Survey (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1980) at 40, 82;
Frideres, ed., Canada's Indians: Contemporary Conflicts (Scarborough: Prentice Hall
of Canada, 1974) at 164.
41 See Robertson, Reservations Are For Indians (Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel,
1970) at 16.
42 See the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
43Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, ss. 110 and 111. A newly enfranchised Indian
was permitted to keep lands formerly allotted to him if the band council and the
Governor-In-Council were willing to let the land cease to be part of the reserve. For a
history of Indian voting rights in Canada, see Bartlett, Citizens Minus: Indians and the
Right to Vote (1980-81), 44 Sask. L. Rev. 163.
44 S.C. 1951, c. 29; R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
45 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, ss. 74, 73, 81, 83, 18 and 20.
46Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 66 provides that a band council can prevent
the Minister from spending band monies for purposes not specifically enumerated in the
Act, for example.
47 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 73.
48Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 107.
49 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 81.
5°Indian Conditions, supra note 40, at 82 and Robertson, supra note 41, at 119.
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The Act also ensured that about half of the Indians in Canada were ex-
cluded from participation in band government. To vote in band council elec-
tions under the Act, one had to be a status Indian. Numerous Indian classes,
such as the M~tis, 51 Indians who had the right to vote in federal elections,
women who had married non-Indians and children of any of the above, were
deemed non-Indians.
52
It is unclear to what extent Indian Agents took dispute resolution out of
the hands of the Bands. The Agent, as chair of the Band council (officially un-
til 1951 and actually until the late 1960s), controlled decision-making. Given
the white attitude of cultural superiority and the emphasis on "civilizing" In-
dians, presumably the Agents worked to introduce English legal principles to
the bands.
Without question, the Dominion controlled the criminal justice system
regarding Indian offences against whites and capital crimes against other In-
dians. 53 Neither judges, the Northwest Mounted Police (now RCMP), nor the
DIA, questioned the courts' power to try Indians. Many of the acts committed
were only crimes under white law54 and the treaty language was ambiguous
about who had the power to try people who committed crimes on the reserve.
Some resistance arose to the Dominion-imposed government system.
Many bands seemed to covertly resist by following the elective form while
making decisions in the traditional manner, 55 while the Iroquois or Six Nations
have openly defied the imposed system. 56 In 1959, only 54 of a total 3,600 elec-
tors of the Six Nations Indians voted in an important band election. 57 As a
result, the bands challenged the elective process and the Act in general, as con-
trary to treaty. 58 The Ontario High Court upheld the Act and the application
of the elective system to the bands, holding that the grant of legislative
jurisdiction to the Dominion in the BNA Act gave Parliament the power to
abrogate treaties by legislation.
51 The Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29; R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, gave statutory expression
to the Crown's disparate treatment of Misis. The Crown had extinguished Mdtis' title to
lands now part of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories by giving M6tis alienable
land or transferable script that could be exchanged for land. Since M~tis had no treaty
rights in reserve lands, the Crown did not allow them to participate in reserve government.
For a brief history of the M~tis people, see Note, Mdtis Rights in the Mackenzie
River District of the Northwest Territories, [1980] 1 C.N.L.R. 1.
52Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 12. Exclusion of Indian women who had mar-
ried non-Indians was carried forward from a much earlier statute: S.C. 1869, 32 & 33
Vict., c. 6, s. 6.
53 Note, Justice on the Northern Frontier: Early Murder Trials of Native Accused
(1979-80), 22 Crim. L.Q. 74.
54 Indian acts that only whites defined as crimes included killing those possessed by
evil spirits and celebrating the potlatch; id. at 76; Bartlett, supra note 4, at 585.
55 Indian Affairs Branch, Hawthorne Commission, Survey of Contemporary In-
dians in Canada (Ottawa: n. pub., 1966), reprinted in Bartlett, supra note 4, at 600.
56 Wilson, Apologies to the Iroquois (1959) at 260. Wilson gives a detailed and sym-
pathetic account of the Iroquois' efforts to assert self-government.
57Logan v. A.-G. Canada, [1959] O.W.N. 361, 20 D.L.R. (2d) 416 (Ont. H.C.).
58 Id. The tribe argued in part that s. 74 of the Indian Act was an ultra vires delega-
tion of Parliamentary authority to the Minister of Indian Affairs. The tribes further
argued that the Act contravened treaty provisions that had left the tribes free to govern
themselves.
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The Indian Acts of 1884 and 1951 were supposed to foster Indian self-
government, gradually molding the bands into something like white
municipalities. Indian society languished under the DIA's supervision. Reserve
conditions were poor; most Indians who lived off the reserve lived in urban
ghettos.59
It was in this climate that the government made its latest call for assimila-
tion. In 1969, the Trudeau government, through the Minister of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development, Jean Chr~tien, delivered a statement on Indian
policy - known as the "White Paper" - to Parliament that represented a
major "break with the past." 6 Playing on the theme that separate treatment
perpetuates unequal treatment which is inherently bad for society, the Minister
spoke forcefully for a new five-point plan to bring "Indian people to full and
equal participation in the cultural, social, economic and political life of
Canada." 61 First, Parliament was to repeal the Indian Act and seek repeal
of the constitutional provision on Indians and Indian lands. Second, the
federal government would close the DIA and turn over all responsibilities for
Indian programmes to the provinces, with the suggestion that "they take over
the same responsibilities for Indians that they have for other citizens."
62
Third, the federal government would end the restriction on land alienation,
giving Indians fee simple title to their reserves. Full ownership would be ac-
companied by provincial taxation. Chr~tien said that Indians could never con-
trol land use, foster development or determine band membership while the
federal government held underlying title to their lands. These proposals would
be put into effect during a five-year period.
In the interim, the government would initiate two other programmes. One
was to provide funds and managerial and technological advice for Indian
economic development. The second was a programme of Indian culture
promotion.
While the new plan was carried forward, the government would observe
the treaties. The Minister saw little value in continuing to follow them for any
length of time. "A plain reading of the words used in the treaties reveals the
limited and minimal promises which were included in them .... [Olnce Indian
lands are securely within Indian control, the anomaly of treaties between
groups within society ... will require that these treaties be reviewed to see how
they can be equitably ended." 63
The Indian response to the new assimilation policy was dramatic - and
negative. An important early response was that of the Indian Chiefs of Alber-
ta, who struck a universal Indian chord with Citizens Plus. 64 The title refers to
a conclusion of the Hawthorn Report, a study of Indian affairs commissioned
by Parliament only three years before Chr~tien's address, which reads: "In-
dians should be regarded as 'Citizens Plus.' In addition to the normal rights
59 Indian Conditions, supra note 40, at 143.
60 Dept. of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the Govern-
ment of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 8.
611d. at 8.
62 Id. at 6.
63Id. at 11.
64 Indian Chiefs of Alberta, Citizens Plus (Indian Assoc. of Alta., 1970).
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and duties of citizenship, Indians possess certain additional rights as charter
members of the Canadian community." 
65
Point by point, Citizens Plus rejected the proposed policy. Rather than
seek repeal of the Indian section of the Constitution "the Government of
Canada should entrench the treaties in the written Constitution." 66 The Chiefs
agreed that the Indian Act should be amended to remove barriers to band self-
government but rejected as simplistic its complete repeal. They argued for
retention of the sections protecting special status based on historical rights. As
for turning over Indian programmes to the provinces, the Chiefs reminded the
Canadian government of its treaty obligations, given in exchange for title to
huge tracts of land, to assist Indian people to develop the reserves, provide
education and health care and protect Indian hunting and fishing rights. If
programmes were to be transferred, they should be transferred to the bands.
The DIA should continue, but should "act as a national conscience to see that
social and economic equality is achieved between Indians and Whites." 67 The
Chiefs also took issue with the land ownership plan and its basic assumptions.
First, the Chiefs argued that Indians already owned the lands, the government
only held them in trust "to prevent the sale or breaking up of our land."168 Sec-
ond, they pointed out the false premise that Indians cannot control their lands
unless they own them and are taxed on them like private property owners:
tribal governments can make land use decisions without owning alienable and
taxable lands. 
69
The Chiefs did not attack the interim proposals for assistance in the
economic and cultural spheres, but cultural promotion was empty without
preservation of "our status, rights, lands and traditions. ' 70 The brief period
of proposed economic assistance was not enough. In its place, the Chiefs sug-
gested an extensive plan for reserve development which would lead to
economic self-sufficiency. The federal government would contribute the better
part of a capital development fund to be administered by tribes with the
assistance of business and government agencies. Interestingly, this develop-
ment plan was to bring "the entire [Indian] community into the mainstream
of Canadian life.' 7 One of the programmes was to teach unemployed reserve
Indians "consumer values and the value of a dollar" and other attitudes essen-
tial to success as a modern worker. 72 The goals of the Chiefs' economic plan
were not so different from those of the government.
The greatest source of Indian rancor in the White Paper was the dismissal
of treaties. The Chiefs argued that the government's "plain reading" ignored
the oral promises made by the treaty commissioners recorded in their reports




69 lndian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 81. It is interesting that the Chiefs referred to
removal of lands from trust status as a "system of allotment that would give individuals
ownership with rights to sell," Citizens Plus, supra note 64, at 9. This seems to be a
reference to the allotment system in effect on United States Indian reservations circa
1890-1930. See text accompanying notes 361-68, infra.




and deleted when the treaties were recorded in Ottawa. The oral promises
should be observed and all of the promises should be viewed in a modern light.
For example, the government's promise to provide teachers was a commitment
to provide Indian children the educational opportunity equal to their white
neighbours. The machinery and livestock symbolized economic develop-
ment. 73 Further, the terms of the treaties should be read in favour of the In-
dians to compensate for their being written in a foreign tongue. Under these
rules of interpretation, the treaty promises are far from minimal.
The White Paper is certainly susceptible of criticism. The proposed im-
plementation period is very brief. In 1969, few Indians had had any experience
of self-government or land management and reserve Indians had little ex-
perience of life beyond the reserve. Education, missing from the plan, would
be necessary for Indians to enter Canadian society as "full and equal" part-
ners. It would require several years to give the average registered Indian
enough education to deal with the complexities of modern Canada.
The land programme is especially problematic. The high unemployment
rate, coupled with the lack of education, bodes ill for Indian retention of land
once it is removed from trust. The White Paper did not contemplate how In-
dians were to pay property taxes without income pending full development of
the reserves. Neither does it show a grasp of the economic reality of being land
poor. The unsophisticated rural Indian is not likely to understand that he has
signed away his land as collateral for a needed loan or a consumer item.
The White Paper betrayed a limited knowledge of the American ex-
perience. The United States followed a policy in the 1950s very similar to that
proposed in the White Paper, known as "termination". Its repercussions were
so severe that most of the "terminated" Indians successfully sought return to a
government-recognized tribal status.
As with termination in the United States, the White Paper policy would
have likely resulted in a major reduction in Indian lands, and led a leading In-
dian spokesman to declare that the government proposal would leave "our
people with n.o land and consequently the future generation would be con-
demned to the ugly spectre of urban poverty in ghettos." 74
Trudeau's call for Indian assimilation helped to spark an Indian move-
ment for self-government, 75 but this meeting of opposed forces - the Liberal
government for assimilation, Indians for autonomy - has dead-locked pro-
posals for Indian Act amendment. Indians are afraid that the loss of special
status would kill any chance for self-government so they accept the Act as a
necessary compromise measure pending adoption of their proposals. 76 Parlia-
ment, through the DIA, thus retains control over Indian government,
although most of the proposals in the White Paper have been dropped.
73Id. at8.
74 Supra note 64, at 1. Then there is the moral problem of seeking to rescind the
"limited and minimal promises" which the Crown made in exchange for peacefully
gaining title to Canada: "Great nations, like great men, should keep their word."
Justice Hugo Black dissenting in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Na-
tion, 362 U.S. 99 at 142 (1960).
75 See Note, Proposal of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians for the Revision of the
Indian Act, 2 August 1979, [1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 1.
16Id. at3.
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During the last fifteen years, the DIA has responded to considerable
pressure from Indian groups and has weakened its grip on band government.
The DIA has exercised its discretion in greater harmony with Indian desire,
giving many bands authority to decide on reserve development projects and
authority to expend funds. The DIA removed the Indian agents from the
reserves. 77 The Dominion no longer forces elective government on the bands. 78
About five percent of the bands have returned to their traditional government
system, increasing to one third of the total the bands that had employed tradi-
tional government. 79 The DIA has given individual bands a choice of whether
Indian women who marry non-Indian men will retain Indian status. 80 Funds
for band administration have greatly increased. 8 l Yet while the DIA has en-
couraged band self-government to a degree, the discretion remains in the DIA
to stifle Indian efforts of self-government; the Dominion Parliament has not
amended the Indian Act to reduce the DIA's power.
C. Indian Powers of Self-Government
The treaties serve as the only definitions of Indian-White relationships ac-
quiesced to by Indians, and, it is urged, must form the basis of Indian powers.
If one treats these agreements as contracts, it can be seen that Indians did not
agree to give up self-government when they bargained away use of most of
their land in Canada. As with contract interpretation:
In the interpretation of the clauses of a treaty, one must first look to the words
used and give to those words the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to
them at the time the treaty was made. To do so, too, it is both proper and ad-
visable to have recourse to whatever authoritative record may be available of the
discussions surrounding the execution of the treaty.
82
The treaties contain two clauses relating to Indian government. The first
states that reserves set aside for purposes other than farming were to be "ad-
ministered and dealt with" for Indians by the Dominion. 83 Under the second,
the Indians promised to:
[O]bey and abide by the law, that they will maintain peace and good order between
each other and also between themselves and other tribes of Indians, and between
themselves and other of Her Majesty's subjects now inhabiting or hereafter to in-
habit any part of the said ceded tract ... ; and that they will aid and assist the of-
ficers of Her Majesty in bringing to justice and punishment any Indian offending
against the stipulations of this treaty, or infringing the laws enforced in the coun-
try so ceded. 84
77 Indian Conditions, supra note 40, at 82.
78Id.
79 Id. at 84.
80Indian News, July 1980 at 1, col. 1.
81 Indian Conditions, supra note 40, at 78.
82Regina v. Johnston (1966), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 749 at 752, 56 W.W.R. 565 at 569, 49
C.R. 203 at 206 (Sask. C.A.).
83 "Treaty No. 3" in Indian Treaties and Surrenders, supra note 22, at 305.
84Id. at 307. For a typical corresponding provision in a United States-Indian treaty
see Treaty with the Sioux of 1868, Art. 1, 15 Stat. 635 (1869).
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The first provision seems to exclude most reserve lands from federal ad-
ministration.85 The treaties speak of federal administration of non-farmland
and they mention farmland without stating who is to administer it. 86 There is
abundant evidence that most of the reserve lands were to be farmed. First, the
treaties provided that the Dominion would give the Indians plows and other
farm tools, seed and cattle "all for the encouragement of agriculture among
the Indians." 87 Second, reserve size was determined according to the acreage
that each Indian family could be expected to farm. After the fact, most reserve
land was farmed. 88 In keeping with the principle that the "language used in
treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice," 89 the
treaties' silence on the administration of farming reserves, considered in light
of the surrounding circumstances, should be interpreted as retaining that
power for Indians.
The treaties may also be interpreted as having granted Indians governing
power over non-farm reserve lands. Indian understanding of treaty terms at
the time of treaty-making is critical to treaty construction. 9o If Indians believed
"administer" to be a temporary condition or to mean that the government
would exclude non-Indians from reserves, the meaning of the term would be
construed as such. It would depend largely on what the Crown representatives
told the Indians. Manitoba Indians maintain that the Crown representatives
did not tell them that signing treaties meant surrendering autonomy. 91
The "abide by the law" provision raises more difficulties than the "ad-
minister" provision. By which "law" were the Indians to abide? It is hard to
imagine the Crown representatives through their translator describing English
law to the Indian peoples. There is no indication that they did so: many In-
dians did not believe that they were signing away self-government. Indeed, the
85 The "administer" provision could be construed narrowly so that even non-farm
reserve lands might be administered by the Crown but Indian activities not directly af-
fecting the land would be left under Indian administration. This more closely accords
with the Indian view. See Anderson, Canadian Indian Rights Under International Law
(1981), 7 Am. Indian J. 2; Wahbung, supra note 4, at 1.
86 Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees and undertakes to lay aside reserves for
farming lands, due respect being had to lands at present cultivated by the said
Indians, and also to lay aside and reserve for the benefit of the said Indians, to
be administered and dealt with for them by her Majesty's government of the
Dominion of Canada, in such a manner as shall seem best, other reserves of
land in the said territories hereby ceded.
Indian Treaties and Surrenders, supra note 22, at 305.
871Id. at 307. See also Bartlett, The Establishment of Indian Reserves on the
Prairies, [1980] 3 Can. L. Rep. 3.88 Robertson, supra note 41, at 511.
89 Supra note 30.
90 Id. at 648-49 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Taylor and Williams, supra note 33.
91 See Wahbung, supra note 4, at 3. One of the Crown treaty negotiators in
Manitoba, Lieutenant-Governor Archibald, told Indians the following:
But the Queen, though she may think it good for you to adopt civilized habits,
has no idea of compelling you to do so. This she leaves to your choice, and you
need not live like the white man unless you can be persuaded to do so of your
own free will.
Morris, supra note 23, at 29.
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Six Nations argued as late as 1977 that they had never surrendered sovereignty
and had remained allies, not subjects, of the Queen. 92 The belief of the
Manitoba Indians that they had retained self-government powers has already
been mentioned. 93
Even assuming that Indians agreed to live by Anglo-Canadian law, it is
not certain that they surrendered all power to deal with crimes and disputes.
Indians agreed to help the government bring Indians who violated the treaty or
the laws enforced in the ceded lands "to justice and punishment." ' 94 This is
clearly limited to criminal actions since punishment was involved. The agree-
ment appears further limited to include only disputes and crimes arising off the
reserves since it refers to ceded lands and the Indians retained title in the
reserves.95
To summarize, the treaty language indicates that Indians did not give up
the power to govern at least the farming reserves. It is doubtful that the In-
dians understood that the treaties incorporated Anglo-Canadian law by
reference. They probably meant to keep power to punish Indian crimes which
occurred on the reserve. Looking to the language of the agreement, the sur-
rounding circumstances and the understanding of the parties, Indians
contracted to give up much less self-governing power than the Dominion
assumed.
An unconscionability analysis could also be applied to the termination of
native self-government. It is readily maintained that Indians received a worse
deal than did whites under the numbered treaties. Whites gained the use of
huge areas of land, a pledge of peace and, according to Canadian law, near-
complete control over Indian life. 96 In return, Indians received annuities and a
few farm animals and tools. 97 Indians maintain that the Crown negotiators
never mentioned government by the Crown. The negotiators promised the
Queen's protection but Indians took this to mean only protection from whites,
not control of Indian government. Further, Indians often bargained from an
unequal position. Many were close to starvation when treaties were offered
and sought government protection against famine. 98 The unconscionable
elements of oppression and unfair surprise are both present.
92 See Isaac v. Davey, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 897. The traditional tribal leaders argued that
the Six Nations was not a "band" within the meaning of the Act. One definition of
"band" at s. 2(a), encompasses Indians who live on lands the title to which is held by
the Crown. Since the Six Nations received their lands from the Crown in fee, they were
not a "band" and the Act did not apply to them. The Court found a way around this
difficulty. The Indians' deed required that land alienation only be made to the Crown.
Once this was done the Crown, in accordance with the Act, sold the land and held the
money in trust. Once the government had the money in hand, the Six Nations became a
"band" under s. 2(b) which defines "band" as any Indians for which the government
holds monies.
93 See Wahbung, supra note 4, at 3.
94E.g., "Treaty No. 3," 1 Treaties, supra note 22, at 307.
95 Manitoba Indians argued that they never agreed to surrender jurisdiction over
Indians who committed crimes. Wahbung, supra note 4, at 3.
961ndian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
97E.g., "Treaty No. 3," 1 Treaties, supra note 22, at 305.
98Robertson, supra note 41, at 97.
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A degree of Indian self-government is rooted in treaty. To the Indians'
dismay, the federal Government considers treaties to be contractual agree-
ments by one segment of society with the rest of society which are subject to
unilateral change by the Dominion Parliament. 99 And Parliament has acted
forcefully to limit Indian self-government with the Indian Acts.
While Indians can pass by-laws, the federal Government has done virtually
nothing to help Indians to develop the enforcement aspect of their municipal
powers. Because the federal Government does not consider violation of a by-
law to be a federal offence, the RCMP will not help to enforce by-laws. 100 The
Dominion has never supplied funds to bands for by-law enforcement. 101 At
this time, a band must go into court to enforce by-laws. 102 It can seek represen-
tation by the Attorney-General of Canada to press claims10 3 or it can bring its
own action. 104 An example of band weakness in the area of judicial enforce-
ment is furnished by Joe v. Findley. 105 A band member was residing on reserve
land in violation of a reserve zoning ordinance. The band could only impose a
maximum penalty of $100 and thirty days in jail under section 81(r) of the In-
dian Act. To force him to move, the band had to seek an injunction in Provin-
cial court against the violator.
As noted in the Dominion powers section above, Indians are assuming
more power over Indian affairs. The government encourages Indian political
participation at the band level and, in an advisory capacity, at the federal
government level. The DIA has found that an increasing number of bands are
"sufficiently advanced" to control their own funds 0 6 although it considers
few bands advanced enough, however, to levy taxes. 107 Most bands manage
housing, recreation and social assistance programmes, 108 but less than twenty
percent of the bands pass by-laws. 0 9 Most that do, do not pass by-laws
regulating housing, recreation, and social assistance. This seems to say that the
band councils are primarily administering Dominion programmes despite their
power to create their own regulatory schemes.
The government gives funds to major Indian political organizations, 110
but has limited the participation of these organizations in constitutional
amendment and patriation to advice only. They have encouraged Indian
99 See Cardinal, supra note 32, and Francis, supra note 14. Certainly a nation has
the power to unilaterally revoke a contract. Fairness, and the more practical considera-
tion, trust, seem to dictate some sort of compensation for contract breaches.
'(°°Morse, By-Law Enforcement Options, [1980] 2. C.N.L.R. 61 at 67.
01 Id. at 65.
102 Unlike the American tribes, Canadian bands do not have band courts. See text
accompanying notes 258-68 and 321-34, infra for information on the jurisdiction of In-
dian tribal courts in the United States.
10 3 See Logan v. A.G. Can., supra note 57.
104 The Queen v. Devereaux (1965), 51 D.L.R. (2d) 546 (S.C.C.).
105 (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 747 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
106 Robertson, supra note 41, at 111.
107 S.O.R./78-953.
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discussion of their proposals"' but refused Indians any power or standing in
constitutional decision-making. Over strenuous Indian objections, the federal
government and the provinces agreed to adopt constitutional provisions on In-
dians which acknowledged tribal status and legal rights recognized by case law
but fell far short of Indian desires. In frustration, Indians took their
case - unsuccessfully - to the Queen and the British Parliament:
While Indians did not attain guarantees of partial sovereignty, their rights
were clearly strengthened by the new Constitution. At a minimum, section
35112 sets a floor for native rights. Existing case law respecting treaty and
aboriginal rights may not be overturned insofar as it upholds those rights. Of-
ficial administrative opinions, to the extent that they upheld native rights at
the time of the new Constitution's adoption as well as the few similar provi-
sions of the Indian Act, may not be retreated from. Because the term "existing
aboriginal rights" is not qualified, it should be read to include any right exer-
cised by native peoples which the Canadian Parliament has not taken or which
was not surrendered by treaty. 113 The separate reference to aboriginal rights in
land in section 25114 supports the idea that section 35 aboriginal rights encom-
pass ceremonial/religious practices, rights to self-government and other rights
not removed by treaty or federal statute. "
5
Indians have also called for federal regulation to make bands self-
governing. Arguing that the Indian Act established an unconstitutional
ministerial dictatorship over Indians, the Union of Nova Scotia Indians has
proposed a Band Government Act." 6 Under the Act, an Indian band would
have the option to adopt a constitution setting forth the manner of band
government. It would then control all band funds and have the power to
revocably assign its powers to the Minister instead of working under the ex-
isting contrary Minister-band relationship. Maintaining its position that In-
dian powers are a privilege subject to Parliamentary revocation, the Dominion
has not considered the proposed Band Government Act.
Indian News, May 1980 at 3, col. 1.
12 Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada
35.(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and confirmed.
(2) In this Act, 'aboriginal peoples of Canada' includes the Indian, Inuit and
M~tis peoples of Canada.
113 This raises the spectre of the difficult proof problems inherent in aboriginal title
cases. See generally Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (3rd ed., Charlottesville:
Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982) at 492-93; Price, Proving Aboriginal Title Via Expert
Testimony: Lessons From the Indian Claims Comm'n (1981), 7 Am. Indian J. 16.
11425 The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be con-
strued so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights
or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada, including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation
of October 7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that may be required by the aboriginal peoples of
Canada by way of land claims settlement.
115An example would be the right to band courts and more traditional means of
dispute resolution. The right was not surrendered by treaty, at least as to jurisdiction
over Indian offences, and the Indian Act sanctions it. See R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 81.
116Supra note 75.
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D. Conclusion
Little remains of Indian self-government. Band councils retain some
powers of municipal government, all of which are revocable by Parliament.
Only after increased pressure on and involvement in the federal government
are Indians regaining any power over their lives. Since Indian constitutional
plans have been thwarted, Indians will have to rely on the non-Indian peoples
of Canada, through the federal government, to permit Indians the measure of
self-government that non-Indian communities take for granted.
III. CANADIAN INDIAN LAND USE
A. Introduction
Prior to European contact, many Indians farmed and hunted, travelling
between farm town and hunting ground on an annual cycle, while others relied
solely upon game and fish for food. 117 As a result of their contact, many In-
dians traded furs for European goods; few Indians adopted the settled Euro-
pean agrarian life. 18 The concepts of land ownership and water rights on
which European farming and resource development were based were alien to
most Indians, 119 though hunting territories were well-defined.120 The Great
Lakes Indians were an exception, many being farmers. Although farmland
might be used in common, individuals or nuclear families generally owned the
plots they farmed. Exploitive land use was considered a sacrilege by many
bands, particularly those which relied most heavily on hunting and fishing for
subsistence. 121
To assimilate Indians into European Canada the government planned to
set up Indian municipal governments to administer reserves which would be
farmed by Indians, 122 although many of the affected Indians had in fact been
hunters. As with Indian government, Parliament gave the DIA nearly unbridl-
ed discretion over Indian lands. Indian Affairs Agents often abused their
powers, leasing the prime reserve agricultural land to whites. 123 To the present
day, few Indians farm or manage reserve lands. 124 This section discusses these
developments, the degree of provincial control over Indian lands, and the
amount of Indian control over land use that remains.
B. Dominion Powers Over Indian Lands
Under the treaties negotiated pursuant to the Royal Proclamation of
1763, Indians retained reserve lands, many for unspecified purposes, many ex-
117 Hodge, supra note 17, at 359, 462, 617.
"I Id. at 478.
19 Indian Rights and Treaty Reservation Branch, Fed. of Sask. Indians, "Spirit
and Intent of Treaties," reprinted in Bartlett, Indian and Native Rights of Uranium
Development in Northern Saskatchewan (1980-81), 45 Sask. L. Rev. 18.
120Eggan, "Social Anthropology: Methods and Results," in Eggan, ed., Social
Anthropology of North American Tribes (2nd ed., Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1955)
at 523.
121 See Heidenreich, "Huron" in Trigger, ed., 15 Handbook of North American
Indians at 380.
122 See text accompanying notes 35-39, 86-88, supra.
2 Robertson, supra note 41, at 111.
24 Id.
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pressly for farming. 125 Although they did not mention water or mineral rights,
land possession by Indian bands "is of the same effect in relation to day-to-
day control thereof as possession of land by any person owning the title in fee
simple." 126 Therefore, presumably, Indians retained water and mineral rights.
Indians so believe. 127 In order to protect Indian rights in land, the treaties re-
quired that Indian bands, not Indian individuals, agree to alienate reserve
lands and that Indians could only alienate these lands to the Crown. 128 The
Iroquois are in a unique situation regarding their lands. They hold a fee simple
patent from the Crown given to them in reward for their alliance with Great
Britain during the United States War for Independence. 1
29
The Indian Act of 1951 detailed DIA powers over land use that exist to the
present. Under section 18 of the Act, the Minister may direct the use of reserve
lands for farming, schools, cemeteries, health projects, and, with the band
council, any other purpose for the welfare of the band. 130 The Minister may
subdivide land and build roads. 131 The band can request land management
powers from the Minister. However, the Minister has complete discretion
regarding this request and can withdraw, at any time, any rights granted.
32
The only power over land reserved to the band, apart from denial of consent to
"any other purpose," is the power of allotment to band members and to
transfer rights among members. 133 Even this power is subject to the Minister's
approval.
The Act also sets out a procedure for alienation of reserve land rights to
non-Indians known as surrender. Surrender must be made to the Crown and
assented to by a majority of band electors or by a majority of the electors pres-
ent at a second election if only a minority of electors took part in the first elec-
tion. 134 Band consent was required under the traditional principle that protec-
tion of Indian land interests necessitated exclusive power to purchase Indian
lands rest in the Crown. 1
35
This principle was partially circumvented under the Act by permitting the
Minister to operate farms on the reserve and to authorize any use of land by
any person for up to one year without band consent. 136 This power fostered a
major deprivation of band control over its lands. Agents lease most arable
land to white farmers. 137 Since Indian interest in reserve lands is limited to use,
they lost their interest under the Act even absent surrender.
125 E.g., "Treaty No. 6," 2 Treaties, supra note 22, at 35.
126 Brick Cartage Ltd. v. The Queen, [1965] 1 Ex. C.R. 102 at 106-107.
127 See "Spirit and Intent of Treaties," supra note 119, at 33 and Wahbung, supra
note 4, at 1-3.
128 See e.g., "Treaty No. 6," 2 Treaties, supra note 22.
129Isaacv. Davey, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 897, 77 D.L.R. (3d) 481, 16 N.R. 29.
130 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, ss. 18(2), 70.
131 lndian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, ss. 19, 34.
132 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 60.
133 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 24.
34 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 37 et seq.
135 This principle is rooted in the RoyalProclamation of 1763 and was strongly sup-
ported by the chief Canadian negotiators. See Morris, supra note 23, at 30.
136 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, ss. 28(2), 71.
137 Robertson, supra note 41, at 111.
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The Six Nations (Iroquois Confederacy) attacked the Act's land provi-
sions as inconsistent with Indian sovereignty in Logan v. Attorney-Generalfor
Canada.3 8 In that case, the Six Nations band attacked the surrender method
because the election rules conflicted with traditional Iroquois government. The
tribes also attacked the broad powers of the Minister under the Act as inconsis-
tent with the fee simple grant given by the King as reward for service in the
United States War for Independence. 139 The Court held that the Minister's
control of Iroquois funds made the Iroquois "Indians" within the meaning of
the Indian Act; therefore, the Act applied to them. This case underscored the
virtually complete DIA control of Indian reserve lands regardless of whether
those lands were set aside by treaty or were owned by Indians in fee simple.
The only mention of water rights in the treaties is the right of all persons
to use waterways adjacent to reserves. 14° The treaties indicate no intent to
transfer water rights. Indians did not view water as property, 14' yet the
Crown's treaty negotiators represented a society that did not consider water
alienable from adjacent lands. At common law, water rights were appurtenant
to riparian lands. Since the treaties contain no language to the contrary, it
should not be assumed that the Dominion gained control of Indian rights in
water on or adjacent to reserves by treaty. Arguably, Indians retained at least
riparian rights.
With the Northwest Territories Irrigation Act, 142 the government enacted
a "prior appropriation" 143 water rights scheme throughout all of Canada
north and west of Manitoba. It required that persons obtain a licence by 1896
or forfeit rights in water to the Crown that were not riparian or for
"domestic" uses. 144 The DIA, which was responsible for Indian lands at this
time, apparently sought no licences on behalf of Indian bands,145 probably
forfeiting most Indian water rights in what is now northern Manitoba,
146
Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and the Northwest Territories.
The treaties limited the Dominion power to authorize mineral develop-
ment to ceded lands. 147 This was reflected in the Indian Act of 1886 which in-
138 Supra note 74.
139 The deed or agreement is called the Simcoe Patent. See Treaties, supra note 22.
1
40E.g., "Treaty No. 7," 2 Treaties, id. at 58.
141 Ballantyne and LacLaRonge Bands, Aski-Puko The Land Alone, reprinted in
Bartlett, Indian Water Rights on the Prairies (1980), 11 Man. L.J. 59 at 61-62.
142 North-west Irrigation Act, S.C. 1894, c. 30 as am. by S.C. 1895, c. 33.
143 "Prior appropriation" refers to the system of water rights used in most of
western North America. The keystone of prior appropriation is the allocation scheme in
times of shortage: whomever first appropriates water on a stream for a "beneficial
use" - domestic, agricultural, manufacturing or mining - has priority over all subse-
quent "appropriators" on the stream. No restriction exists on place of use; it may be in
another watershed altogether. This is in sharp contrast to the riparian system under
which rights to water are tied to riparian land ownership and loss of use is apportioned
among the users in times of scarcity. See Clark, Water and Water Rights (Allen Smith
Co., 1967) at 4.
144 North-west Irrigation Act, S.C. 1894, c. 30 as am. by S.C. 1895, c. 33, ss. 6, 7, 8.
145 Bartlett, supra note 141, at 70.
146 What is now Northern Manitoba was part of the Northwest Territories when the
North-west Irrigation Act, S.C. 1894, c. 30 was passed.
147 Supra note 125, at 37.
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cluded minerals in the definition of reserve, thus giving them the protection of
the formal surrender process. 148 In 1919, Parliament partially abrogated the
treaties by amending the Indian Act to allow leases to surface rights for
precious metal mining without surrender, 149 which provision Parliament later
extended to include leasing for all surface mining. 150 Parliament resumed
upholding of Canada's treaty promises in 1951 by making surface minerals
subject to surrender once more.151 Throughout this time, Parliament man-
dated that a band's interest in a reserve was subject to mineral rights which ex-
isted at the time the reserve was created,152 so jeopardizing the existence of
reserves created by government-Indian agreement which contained individual
mining claims.
In apparent violation of treaty, the federal government took away a good
part of Indian water rights and, for a time, Indian control of surface minerals.
Under the quarter-century-old Indian Act provisions, the government con-
tinues to dominate reserve land use, the delegation of land use authority to the
DIA remaining unchanged.
C. Provincial Powers Over Indian Lands
The clear federal legislative power over Indian lands is muddied by the in-
dividual Provincial Terms of Union 153 with the Dominion. As a result, some
provincial laws have effect within reserve boundaries and provincial policies
have affected reserve size and location.
British Columbia is the extreme case. 154 The British Columbia Terms of
Union hold the Dominion to "a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by
the British Columbia government" toward Indians. 155 Apparently, the col-
onial government of British Columbia had made several informal agreements
with Indians regarding reserves up until about five years prior to joining the
Union. 156 During the ensuing five years, Indian concerns were largely ignored
by the colonial government. The provincial government adopted the more re-
cent colonial Indian policy, using the "liberal policy" clause to defeat native
claims to reserves, many of which, due to the informality of the agreements,
were poorly documented. 1
57
Saskatchewan successfully worked to keep mineral-rich lands outside
reserve boundaries. Northern Saskatchewan Indians have had several un-
148 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 43.
149An Act to amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1919, c. 56, s. 1.
150An Act to amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1938, c. 31.
151 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 53(1).
152 The Dominion LandsAct, R.S.C. 1886, c. 54.
153 The Terms of Union are the Canadian equivalent of state admitting statutes in
the United States.
154 At the other extreme is Newfoundland, whose native population had succumbed
to disease and white attack by 1886. Cumming and Mickenberg, eds., Native Rights in
Canada (2nd ed. Toronto: Indian-Eskimo Assoc. of Can. in assoc. with Gen. Pub. Co.,
1972) at 331.
155 Order-in-Council Admitting British Columbia into the Union, R.S.C. 1970,
App. I, no. 10, cl. 13.
156 Id .
157 Daniel, A History of Native Claims Processes in Canada, 1867-1979, (Ottawa:
Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1980) at 27-55.
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completed reserve land claims during this century. In 1925, some of the bands
sought to have a mineral-rich area selected as a reserve. In a letter to the then
Minister of the Interior, the Saskatchewan premier wrote:
It seems to me highly desirable that no action should be taken which would have
the effect of throwing mineralized sections of our northern country into Indian
Reserves, if it can be avoided.... If mineralized sections are kept out of Indian
Reserves, as far as possible, there is a chance for their development in the future.
The placing of them within the borders of the Reserves would hamper develop-
ment very materially. 
158
Consistent with the Dominion policy of locating reserves away from mineral
deposits, the Saskatchewan Indians' pending request for reserve location on
mineral lands was denied. 159
The Natural Resources Transfer Agreements, which transferred "the in-
terest of the Crown and all Crown lands" to the province in which the land
was situated, 160 do not give the provinces control over minerals on Indian
reserves 161 but they do convey the Dominion interest in water to the provinces.
The Agreements state that "the interest of the Crown in the waters ... under
the Northwest Territories Irrigation Act, 1898... shall... belong to the prov-
ince, subject to any trusts existing in respect thereof and to any interest other
than that of the Crown." 162 The Northwest Territories Irrigation Act had set
up a prior appropriation scheme throughout the North and West of Canada. It
preserved riparian rights for "domestic" uses. Since the DIA failed to obtain
water licences for Indian bands, it is unclear to what extent Indian bands are
subject to provincial water laws. It may be that Indians did not need licences
because of the prior federal power over reserve lands and the appurtenant
water rights.
Indians and Dominion alike considered water rights to be appurtenant to
land when the numbered treaties were signed and the Indian Act has con-
sistently provided that Indian use rights in land must be surrendered by In-
dians. 163 Yet water rights were not surrendered prior to the Resource
Agreements. Since the Dominion only held underlying title while the Indians
held use rights, 164 it appears that the Agreements only gave the provinces
underlying title to water adjacent to Indian reserves. This underlying title in no
way gave the provinces the right to permit appropriation of Indian water. 165
The provinces do not accept this argument; they contend that they can fully
158 Letter of February 18, 1925, reprinted in Bartlett, supra note 127, at 24.
159 Id. at 25.
160 The BNA Act, 1930, R.S.C. 1970, App. I, no. 25, at 368-78, 386, 393.
161 The BNA Act, R.S.C. 1970, App. I, no. 25, at 370, 380, 388, 395.
162 R.S.A. (1970), c-338. The statutes in Manitoba and Saskatchewan are virtually
identical.
163 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 37 et seq. Minerals were for a time excepted
from this protection. See notes 149 and 150, supra.
164See St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46; 58
L.J.P.C. 54 (P.C.).
165 A leading Indian law commentator has put forth a similar argument but thought
it unlikely to succeed because the Indian riparian interest is indistinct from that of other
riparian owners. See Bartlett, supra note 141, at 70. It seems to this writer that the ma-
jor distinction between these groups is the Indian Act protection of Indian land in-
terests. Non-Indian owners had no such protection.
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regulate water use. 166 It is clear, however, that the provinces do not control the
beds of non-navigable waters nor can they allow flooding of reserve lands
without federal approval. 167
The Resource Agreements apply to wildlife as well as to water, giving the
provinces partial control of reserve hunting. The leading case is Cardinal v.
A.-G. Alberta, 168 in which an Indian had been convicted of selling moose to a
non-Indian on his reserve in violation of the Alberta Wildlife Act. 169 The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding the Natural Resources Transfer
Agreements a valid delegation of federal powers and construing it as permit-
ting provincial regulation of non-subsistence hunting on reserves.
The decision is somewhat contradictory because, as the Court acknowl-
edges, the purpose of the contested provision was "to secure to the Indians of
the Province the continuance of the supply of game and fish for their support
and subsistence."'' 70 Clearly, the sale of meat by a hunter is to provide him
support. Hunting for this purpose should not be capable of provincial regula-
tion unless Parliament was guilty of placing "surplusage" in the statute.
Laskin J.'s dissent strongly argued that the Transfer Agreements were not
intended to delegate any federal power over Indian lands to the provinces. Sec-
tion 91(24) of the Constitution prohibited this, making the resources of Indian
lands, including wildlife, subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction at least as far
as Indians were concerned. 171 In his view, the Agreements conformed to con-
stitutional design because their purpose was to affirm Indian hunting rights,
not limit them.
The Cardinal decision left a portion of the case law on provincial regula-
tion of reserve hunting intact but it left confusion as to the breadth of federal
delegation to the western provinces. 172 The provinces could already regulate
non-Indian hunters on the reserve under lower court cases because this regula-
tion was considered incidental to "lands reserved for Indians." 1'73 In Ontario,
however, outside the realm of the Transfer Agreements, the Court of Appeal
had already determined that provincial regulation of Indian hunting on the
reserve was ultra vires. 174 It remains unclear how far a western province can go
before it enters the federal realm. In Cardinal, the Court noted that a provin-
cial law dealing especially with Indians or Indian lands would be ultra vires75
166 The Water Resources Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 388; The Water Rights Act, R.S.M.
1970, c. W-80; The Water Rights Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. W-8.
167 See the North-west Irrigation Act, S.C. 1894, c. 30 as am. by S.C. 1895, c. 33.
161 Cardinal, supra note 32.
169 Wildlife Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 391, s. 37.
170 (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 553 at 562.
71 Id. at 570.
172 Much of this confusion centres on provincial control of hunting on ceded lands.
This issue is related to regulation of reserve hunting because of wildlife's continuing
disregard for political boundaries but is beyond the scope of this treatment of reserve
issues. For a discussion of some of the off-reserve hunting uncertainties, see Note,
Aboriginal Hunting Rights: Some Issues Raised by the Case of R. v. Frank (1976-77), 41
Sask. L. Rev. 101.
173 SeeR. v. McLeod, [1930] 2 W.W.R. 37; R. v. Morley, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 483.
11R. v. Hill(1968), 15 O.L.R. 416 (Ont. C.A.).




but this does little to clarify the field. For instance, does a conservation-based
restriction on manner of hunting apply to Indians? In a pre-Cardinal decision,
a court had held that a regulation prohibiting use of a type of bullet did not ap-
ply to an Indian hunting on ceded lands on which he had a right to hunt under
the Transfer Agreements. 176 The question of what independent meaning the
term "support" has, if any, has not really been resolved by the Court either.
Apart from federal-provincial agreement, the Dominion has increased
provincial power over Indians unilaterally, with the passage of section 88 of
the Indian Act which incorporates provincial law by reference:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada,
all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are ap-
plicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that such
laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made
thereunder, and except to the extent that such laws make provision for any matter
for which provision is made by or under this Act. 177
Prior to its passage in 1951, courts took a very narrow view of provincial
powers over Indian affairs on reserves.1 78 Section 88 grants no provincial
powers of enforcement but it has led to ever-greater provincial regulatory con-
trol of life on the reserves. 
179
Provincial law is still pre-empted by treaty provisions under section 88. In
R. v. White and Bob, 180 the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of an Indian
charged with hunting off the reserve in violation of provincial game law. The
provincial law was held invalid under section 88 because it contravened a treaty
guarantee of traditional hunting rights. It is interesting to note that the treaty on
which the defendant relied was not a formal agreement. Nonetheless, the
Court held that a section 88 "treaty" included all agreements with Indians
"made by persons in authority as may be brought within the term 'the word of
the white man'." 181
Section 88 does not apply provincial law regarding minerals, and perhaps
water, to Indians due to the Indian Act provisions providing for surrender and
DIA administration of lands. The scope of "laws of general application" re-
mains unsettled. Chief Justice Laskin has remarked that the provision does not
bear on Indian lands at all because it refers only to Indians. 
182
D. Indian Powers Over Indian Lands
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Indians have little remain-
ing power over their lands. They retain the power to prevent land surrender,
have regained some control over land use and may hunt wildlife on the reserves
176 R. v. McPherson, [1971] 2 W.W.R. 640. The language of the Agreements still
prevents a province from limiting the seasons an Indian may hunt. See R. v. Little Bear,
[1958] 26 W.W.R. 335 (Alta. App. Div.).
177 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 88.
178 Cumming and Mickenberg, supra note 154. The converse was true if the activity
was off-reserve: courts took a broad view of provincial power over Indians.
179 See also Lysyk, "Constitutional Developments Relative to Indians and Indian
Lands," [1978] Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures (Toronto: DeBoo, 1978)
201.
180 (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, 52 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.), aff'd (1966), 52 D.L.R.
(2d) 481.
181 Id. at 649 (D.L.R.).
182 See Cardinal, supra note 32, at 576 (dissent).
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for food. In accord with Indian intent at the time of treaty-making, Indians
cannot freely alienate land.
Although Indians can prevent their lands from being surrendered, the
federal government, if it is persistent, can induce surrender by a minority of a
band. If only a minority of eligible voters take part in the first vote on a given
surrender proposal, the majority of whatever number of voters take part in the
second vote may authorize surrender. As a result, in a band with few voters,
the federal government can gain surrender by manipulating a small minority of
the band. This point was raised in Cardinal v. The Queen,183 now pending
before the Supreme Court. 184 A minority of band members had surrendered
part of a reserve under the Indian Act provisions allowing minority surrender.
The band attacked the Act provision, arguing that the intent of the Act was to
protect Indian rights in land by requiring surrender by a minority of band
members. In ruling against the band, the Federal Court of Appeal applied
municipal and labour law analysis. A clearly-reasoned dissent maintained that
the Act could not have been intended to permit surrender by a minority of the
band since a purpose of the Act is to protect Indian lands. It is conceivable that
the Supreme Court would distinguish Cardinal from Logan, because Cardinal
involves Indian land, an area traditionally protected by the Crown, while
Logan dealt with tribal government, an area the Dominion has generally
undermined. 185 The outcome is hard to predict because a majority in the Ap-
peal Court drew analogies to traditional legal areas in order to avoid using In-
dian precedents. 186
Indian water rights, beyond riparian "domestic" uses, are theoretical. 1
87
Indians could develop their domestic water right for ranching and industrial
power generation under the bands' power to regulate public works on the
reserve. 188 A legislative settlement would probably be necessary before bands
could assert further riparian rights lost to them under the Northwest Ter-
ritories Irrigation Act.
Indians, however, have retained some power over reserve land use. Band
councils can zone, locate roads, regulate public works and buildings and
regulate nuisance. 189 They can prevent the Minister from authorizing land use
for any purpose other than farming, schools, cemeteries and health projects
unless the government exercises its power of eminent domain. 190 A band can
also seek enforcement of trespass in provincial court, 191 and one band has suc-
cessfully sued for damages for power line construction on the reserve. 192
183 (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 366, [1980] F.C.R. 149.
184 [1980] 1 S.C.R. vi.
185 Wahbung and Bartlett, supra note 4; Robertson, supra note 41.
186 See Four B Manufacturing, Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031. The Court applied labour law and law of government employees
to uphold application of provincial labour law to Indian employees working on a
reserve.
187 S.C. 1894 (4th Sess.), c. 30, s. 9 as am. by S.C. 1895 (3d Sess.), c. 33, s. 8(2).
188Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 81(f). Few bands regulate reserve water use,
Indian Conditions, supra note 40, at 85.
89 IndianAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 81(f).
'9Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 74, 73 and 18, 39, 42, 81, 83, 91, 114.
191E.g., Joe v. Findlay (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 747, [1980] 5 W.W.R. 121
(B.C.S.C.).
'92 See Johnson v. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority (1981), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 340,
27 B.C.L.R. 50 (S.C.).
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Within its discretion, the federal government has permitted some bands to
regulate fish and game. 193
This regulatory power clearly extends to Indians hunting for food under
the Resources Transfer Agreements and, in Ontario, to all treaty-sanctioned
hunting. It should also apply to non-Indians even if the regulation conflicts
with a provincial regulation because it lies within the ambit of "lands reserved
for Indians." This is another area left uncertain by Cardinal v. A.-G. Alberta.
Even though section 88 requires that the by-law control, the Transfer
Agreements might be interpreted as mandating that the provincial Indians'
limited powers are reduced further by bands' failure to exercise control. 194
Several factors are involved here. First, the long federal history of direct con-
trol over land use has not prepared bands to manage their lands. Second, few
bands have funds for development or band by-law enforcement and the
federal government does not provide such funds.195 Third, band by-laws are
subject to nullification by the DIA at any time. 196 Fourth, many bands seem
satisfied to leave the land substantially alone. 1
97
Indians all across Canada are calling for the Indian control of Indian
lands which they understand was promised them by treaty. 198 Many Indians
have called for federal legislation giving bands complete self-governing status,
including full powers over reserves. 199 One such proposal, the Band Govern-
ment Act, would give bands the power to "exclusively make laws governing...
the assignment; management, use and disposition of reserve lands and
reserves, and of band hunting and fishing rights wherever they may be en-
joyed .... 200
To date, Indians enjoy little power over their own lands and, subject to
the Minister's revocation, exercise only some of the powers of municipal
government on the reserve. The key to Indian control of reserve land use lies
with the Dominion government. Only Dominion legislation which would
weaken the DIA's broad discretion over Indian land use would give Indians
any real power over their lands.
IV. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Introduction
Prior to European contact, Indians, in what is now the United States,
governed as diversely as did Indians in Canada. The Iroquois Confederacy had
a complex "republican" system, with chiefs acting in councils at the tribal and
the federal levels. 201 The Wyandots had a common government system based
193 See Indian Conditions, supra note 40, at 85.
194 Id. at 87.
195 Morse, supra note 100, at 65.
196 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 81.
197 McCullum and McCullum, This Land is Not For Sale (Toronto: Anglican Book
Centre, 1975) at 74-78.
198 Wahbung, supra note 4, at 1 and Bartlett, supra note 127, at 18-19.
199 Bartlett, supra note 4, at 592-93.
200Proposal of the Union of Nova Scotia Indiansfor Revision of the Indian Act, 2
August 1979, [1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 1 at 8.
201 See text accompanying notes 25-36, supra.
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on leadership from heads of extended families. 20 2 The heads of these families
were elder women who selected male chiefs and governed in councils compos-
ed of four women and one man. The council of an extended family dealt with
family decisions and tried the criminally accused. When tribal decisions were
necessary, a grand council of all the family councillors and leading men of the
tribe met. This larger council determined property rights and handled appeals
from convictions of those accused of internecine crime. Conversely, many In-
dian bands had no formal government, but when decision-making was
necessary, acted consensually with the advice of a headman. 2 3 The prominent
Indians of these bands had power but only insofar as they could persuade their
fellows; they lacked authority to give orders.
Indian dispute resolution techniques were as varied as the forms of
government. Many Indians, including the Iroquois, used restitution as punish-
ment for crimes. 204 Revenge was also practiced, in many tribes at the discretion
of the wronged family20 5 and, in some instances, by tribal police. 20 6 Among
several tribes, murder was dealt with by the killer's giving sufficient goods to
satisfy the injured family or by the revenge of an aggrieved person upon a
member of the killer's family, if not upon the actual killer. 20 7 The Wyandots,
for their part, followed formal trial procedures in determining guilt and then
applied the concept of restitution or imposed a sentence of capital punishment,
depending on the crime.
20 8
The following section of the paper deals with Indian government in the
United States. The first subsection outlines the United States government's
policies toward Indian government. These policies have varied widely in em-
phasis, swinging from recognition of Indian sovereignty by treaty-making with
tribes and minimal efforts to control internal Indian affairs, to total control of
Indian government and toward Indian self-government on a United States-
approved model. The assimilation of Indians into white society has been the
dominant theme of the United States' policy with strains of self-determination
becoming louder in the 1930s and beyond. A discussion of the current degree
of the United States' control of Indian government follows. The second
subsection discusses state powers granted by Congress over Indian govern-
ment. The final subsection turns to what remains of Indian self-government
and the growing powers of tribes to govern themselves.
202 Powell, "Wyandot Government," Congressional Record, 46th Cong. 3d Sess.
1060 reprinted in Washburn, The American Indian and the United States: A Documen-
tary History II (New York: Random House, 1973) 1800 at 1804.203 See Hodge, supra note 17, at 449; Castillo, "The Impact of Euro-American Ex-
ploration and Settlement" in Heizer, ed., 8 Handbook of North American Indians
(California, 1978) at 99; Underhill, The Navahos (2d ed., Norman: U. Oklahoma Press,
1967) at 1067. Wuerch, A History of the Middle Chinooks to the Reservation Era (un-
published M.A. thesis, Univ. of Oregon, 1979) at 14-15. Oswalt, This Land was Theirs:
A Study of the North American Indian (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966) at
478-79.
2
04 Hodge, supra note 30, at 616; Tooker "The League of the Iroquois: Its History,
Politics and Ritual" in Trigger, ed., supra note 121, at 418.
205 See Opler, "An Outline of Chircahua Apache Social Organization," in Eggan,
supra note 120, at 235.
206 Provinse, "The Underlying Sanctions of Plains Indian Culture," id. at 341, 349.
207 Washburn, The Indian in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1975) at 17-22.
208 Supra note 202.
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B. Federal Powers Over Indian Self-Government
The federal power regarding Indians was granted, explicitly and implicitly,
by the Constitution. 20 9 The framers vested in the federal government the
general powers to deal with Indians that had formerly been vested in the
Crown.210 Congress was given power to "regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." 211 The treaty-
making power 212 implicitly included Indians because the new national govern-
ment had made its first Indian treaty a decade before the Constitutional
convention. 213 Early on, these two enumerated powers were held to place all
power regarding Indians in the federal government. 214 To a lesser extent, other
constitutional provisions have been relied upon to justify federal power over
Indian affairs; the most important of these are the war-making power and
Congress' power over federal property.
215
Several hundred treaties between Indian tribes and the federal govern-
ment were made between 1778 and 1871.216 States were not allowed to make
treaties, though treaties in force before the Constitution's ratification were left
whole. 217 Treaty language varies depending upon the period and the state of
United States-Indian relations, whether peaceful or hostile, at the time of mak-
ing and the terms of the treaties must be considered in resolving questions of
retained sovereignty and jurisdiction. 218 In general, the treaties provided that
Indians retain traditional Indian hunting and fishing rights and perpetual use
of certain lands known as reservations. 219 The United States promised to pro-
vide protection and care on the reservations, farm animals and tools, annuities
and education. 220 For their part, Indians promised exclusive trade relations
with the United States, an end to hostilities when appropriate and the sur-
render of rights in ceded lands. Some tribes also surrendered the power to allot
reservation lands to individual Indians.
221
Indian government was not mentioned in some treaties; in others, Indian
government was arguably made revocable by the United States. In some, the
only Indian surrender of governmental power was the promise to turn over In-
dians to the United States for punishment who had committed crimes against
209 U.S. Const. art. I, s. 8, cl. 3; art. II, s. 2, cl. 2.
210 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 575 (Ga. S. Ct. 1832) Johnson v. McIntosh 21
U.S. 543 (I1. Dist. Ct. 1823).
211 U.S. Const. art I, s. 8, cl. 3.
212 U.S. Const. art. II, s. 2, cl. 2.
213 Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
214 Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 127, at 559.
215 U.S. Const. art. IV, s. 3, cl. 2; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. 1886); U.S. Const. art. IV, s. 3, cl. 1; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Com-
mission, 411 U.S. 164,93 S. Ct. 1257 (1973).
216 Cumming and Mickenberg, supra note 154; Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S.
194 at 202 (1975).
217 Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1931).
218De Coteau v. District County Court for the Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S.
425, 95 S. Ct. 1082 (1975).
219 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2nd ed., Albuquerque, New Mexico:
U. of New Mexico Press, 1971) at 44.
220Id. at41, 44-45.
221 Treaty with the Omahas, March 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043, art. IV at 1044.
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whites. 222 The broadest language on Indian government, written into treaties
toward the end of the treaty-making period, granted power to the United
States to adopt whatever "policy and management of their affairs, as... may
be most beneficial to them."22
3
As in Canada, the government's primary purpose in treaty-making was to
remove Indians from lands most desired for non-Indian settlement. 224 Unlike
Canada, during its most active treaty-making period the United States often
dealt with hostile tribes that were a real threat to the new nation's survival. The
relative strength of the Indians forced the United States to view them as
sovereign peoples though this attitude changed as Indians grew relatively
weaker. 225 By 1831, the Supreme Court had adopted a position short of accept-
ance of complete Indian sovereignty yet recognized Indian treaties as interna-
tional. 226 The Indian tribes were viewed as "domestic, dependent nations"
with inherent retained sovereignty.
227
Since Indian treaties were not contracts and were not quite international
in nature, the courts formulated special rules of interpretation, especially as
the United States grew stronger during the nineteenth century: ambiguous ex-
pressions must be resolved in favour of the Indian parties concerned; treaties
must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them; and treaties
must be liberally construed in favour of Indians. 228 These rules reflect the
United States' attitude of wardship towards Indians and the idea that "trans-
actions between a guardian and his wards are to be construed favourably
toward the latter." 229 These rules have, generally, led to regular judicial pro-
tection of tribes from government actions contrary to treaty. 230
The relative strengths of Canadian and United States Indians during their
respective treaty periods may explain the relative unimportance that Canada
accords Indian treaties. 231 Canada, from the time of its first Indian Act, dealt
222 Treaty with the Sioux Indians, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, art. I. Treaty with
the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667, art. I.
m Treaty with the Ioways, May 18, 1854, 10 Stat. 1069, art. XIII at 1072. Treaty
with the Sacs and Foxes, May 18, 1854, 10 Stat. 1074, art. XI at 1076.
224 Cohen, supra note 219, at 157.
225 Wilkinson and Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long a Time is That?
(1975), 63 Cal. L. Rev. 601 at 608-12.
226 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
22 7Id. at 17.
228 Cohen, supra note 113, but see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978) (Treaty liberally construed against Indians); Wilkinson and
Volkman, supra note 225, at 376 for a discussion of the wide variation in definition of
these rules when federal statutes appear to conflict with treaties.
229 United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 204 U.S. 111 at 117, 58 S. Ct. 794 at
798 (1938).
230 State of Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel,
443 U.S. 658, 99 S. Ct. 3055 (1979); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,
88 S. Ct. 1705 (1968); United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, supra note 229.
231 Another factor is the relative independence of United States courts. Canadian
Courts feel themselves limited primarily to statutory interpretation. Professor Strayer
notes "the courts have refused to concern themselves with the wisdom or fairness of
legislation.., provided that the Dominion does not infringe on provincial powers, nor
the provinces on the Dominion power, the courts will not interfere." Strayer, Judicial
Review of Legislation in Canada (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1968) at 5-6.
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with friendly, relatively weak bands in what resembled a land contract situa-
tion and came to view the treaties as contractual. 232 Canada acted swiftly to
abrogate its "contracts" and assume complete control over Indian self-
government. 233 The United States assumption of control was somewhat more
gradual.
234
With the development of the reservation system in the mid-nineteenth
century, the United States government began to assume governmental powers
over Indians. Indians retained self-government during the early years of the
system, 235 although tribal autonomy was threatened by the United States'
policy of squeezing several tribes, sometimes hostile to one another, onto one
reservation. 236 Concerned about Indians' unwillingness to adopt white culture,
the government placed Indian agents on the reservations with a mandate as ar-
bitrary and as broad as that of Canada's DIA. 237 The Bureau of Indian Affairs
of the Department of the Interior eventually sent agents to all of the reserva-
tions who, with the aid of Indian police, broke the traditional leadership and
assumed the reins of power. 2
38
The reservation policy often entailed treaty violation, particularly where a
given treaty did not mention the United States' assumption of governmental
power over Indians. The Supreme Court legitimized Congress' treaty abroga-
tion in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,239 a case challenging a land cession that the
United States had obtained in violation of treaty. The Court found that Con-
gress' "plenary power" over Indians gave it the right to take any action con-
cerning Indians regardless of treaty provisions. 24° The Court held that this
"plenary power" was exempt from judicial consideration because it was a
political question under the Constitution. This power survives but it has been
tempered by the canons of treaty construction and the federal courts' unwill-
ingness to deny treaty obligations. 241
The United States further weakened Indian self-government by alloting
most Indian lands to individual Indians at the turn of the nineteenth century.
Under the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act),242 Indians with alloted lands
232 See text accompanying notes 16-20, supra.
233 See text accompanying notes 35-42, supra.
234 See discussion in Cohen, supra note 113, at 47-66.
235 Some tribes, most notably the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma governed
themselves for several decades after the onset of the reservation system until the United
States abrogated its treaties with them and banned the tribes' governments: Prucha,
American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian 1865-1900
(Oklahoma: U. of Oklahoma Press, 1976) at 389-401. This paper necessarily paints with
a broad brush.
236 See Shoshone Tribe, supra note 229.
237 See Prucha, supra note 235, at 193-96; see also, 25 U.S.C. §1-2 (1976). For the
comparable Canadian situation, see text accompanying notes 42-60, supra.
23 8 Prucha, supra note 235, at 194-95; see also Orfield, A Study of the Termination
Policy in 4 Staff of Sub Comm. on Indian Education Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., The Education of American Indians
(Washington: Government Printer, 1969) at 718-19.
239 187 U.S. 553, 23 S. Ct. 216 (1903).
240Id. at 565 (U.S.), 221 (S. Ct.).
241 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974), McClanahan,
supra note 9, Menominee Tribe, supra note 230.
242 General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). See text accompanying
notes 286-303, infra.
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became United States citizens and were removed from tribal affiliation and
control. Most Indians who commented on tribal land allotment were opposed
to it as they feared it would weaken tribal culture and expose Indians to land
speculators. 243 Disparate groups in support of the plan favoured it for much
the same reasons, although the reformers who sought to assimilate Indians did
not expect the rapid change in land ownership that occurred.
244
The land allotment policy was only part of a major assimilative movement
that was to place nearly all power over Indian government in federal hands. 245
In 1883, the Secretary of the Interior ordered the Indian agents to appoint
tribal courts with civil jurisdiction identical to that of Justices of the Peace in
the state or territory adjacent to the reservation. 246 These agents had complete
control over case as well as judge selection. The primary purpose of the courts
was to "put a stop to the demoralizing influence of heathenish rites." ' 247 In
1924, Congress made all Indians citizens of the United States so as to foster at-
tachment to American values and institutions. 248 The most important existing
aspect of the assimilationist policy, however, was embodied in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.249
The Indian Reorganization Act acknowledged the tribal right to self-
government and permitted tribes to adopt constitutions and by-laws which
would be submitted to the BIA for ratification. However, Indians did not have
a choice in selecting their manner of government. The Act stated that constitu-
tions and by-laws had to be approved or revoked by a majority of tribal elec-
tors. 250 At least thirty per cent of the electors had to vote if the election were to
be valid. In addition, individual tribes could not set up a government; all tribes
on a given reservation had to have one tribal council. 251 Most tribes, their
traditional governments crushed by the BIA, adopted constitutions and by-
laws which set up an elective system on the BIA superintendency model.
252
243 Prucha, supra note 235, at 399-400.
244 Id. at 229, 256.
245 For an excellent study of the reform movement that brought forth the assimila-
tion policy, see Prucha, supra note 235.
246 Id. at 209.
247 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1883 quoted in Prucha, supra
note 235, at 209. The BIA agents took other measures to destroy Indian culture such as
the forced cutting of male Indians' hair and the prohibition of face painting. Hair has
religious significance to many Indians; it is not to be cut, see Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670
F. 2d. 1345 (4th Cir. 1982) holding that Virginia prison regulation requiring haircuts in-
fringes on Indian prisoners' freedom of worship. The BIA Commissioner ordered
agents to withhold food from any Indians who insisted on following these customs. See
Jackson and Galli, A History of the BIA and its Activities Among Indians (San Fran-
cisco: R & E. Assoc., 1977).
248 8 U.S.C. §1401(a)(2) (1976). By the time of the Act's passage, as many as two-
thirds of all U.S. Indians had become citizens under other laws and treaties. See
Washburn, infra note 255.
24925 U.S.C. §461-79 (1976), the Act was by no means merely another assimilative
measure. It was also intended to safeguard Indian autonomy to a degree, see Cohen,
supra note 113, at 84-86.
25025 U.S.C. §478a (1970).
25 25 U.S.C. §476 (1976).
252 This meant that most power was vested in an elected tribal council, often with a
strong chairman replacing the BIA agent or superintendent and that no separation of
powers existed. See Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 (1972), 70 Mich. L. Rev. 955.
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The BIA was unwilling to permit the Indian Reorganization Act to reduce
its power over Indian tribes and interpreted the Act to give it the broadest
possible power over tribal government. The BIA assumed not only the power
to veto all proposed tribal constitutions and by-laws, but the power to veto all
tribal ordinances as well. This authority was generally written into the tribal
constitutions that the BIA approved.
25 3
The Act is ambiguous as to a requirement of BIA approval for constitu-
tions and by-laws. 254 Since the BIA's power was not expressly stated in the law
and this power intruded on Indian sovereignty, the BIA should not have
assumed veto power over these documents. BIA approval power over tribal or-
dinances is not mentioned in the statute and is in effect a "bootstrapping" of
authority. The BIA has argued that the statute was intended to create United
States-model tribal governments and that it was simply carrying out Congress'
mandate. 255 Many tribes, relying on the BIA for guidance, acquiesced in the
BIA interpretation.
256
While the BIA retained substantial control over tribal government, the In-
dian Reorganization Act did specify several tribal powers which the BIA had
previously denied Indians. 257 The Act, however, did not restore tribal court
jurisdiction that Congress had previously assumed and Congress has gradually
eroded tribal jurisdiction over crimes on the reservation.
258
Congress directly assumed a great deal of power by removing jurisdiction
over major crimes from tribal authorities. 259 Traditionally, most tribes retain-
ed the power to deal with offenders on Indian lands and intra-Indian crimes
regardless of location. 260 Later treaties demanded that Indians deliver non-
Indians who committed crimes on the reservation to United States' authorities
at the reservation border. 261 No tribes surrendered the power to deal with In-
dians who committed crimes against Indians262 and, in 1883, the Supreme
Court upheld the Indians' right to punish an Indian who had murdered
another Indian. 263 The murderer was punished by a traditional method:
restitution to the deceased relatives. Congress was outraged that the murderer
was not punished more severely and reacted by granting the federal courts
jurisdiction over murder, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and
larceny. 264
253 Gross, Indian Self-Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Re-
cent Indian Policy (1978), 56 Tex L. Rev. 1195 at 1211.
25425 U.S.C. §476.
255 Washburn, Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: A Study of the Past and Pres-
ent Status of the American Indian (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971).
256 Fay, Charters, Constitutions and By-Laws of Indian Tribes of North America
(Colorado: Museum of Anthropology, Colorado State College, 1967).
257 See text accompanying note 242-63, supra.
258 See Clinton, Isolated in their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of
Indian Autonomy and Self-Government (1981), 33 Stan. L. Rev. 979 at 994-95.
259 18 U.S.C. §1153 (1976).
260 Cohen, supra note 219, at 45.
261 Id.
262ExParte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S. Ct. 396 (1883).
263 Id.
264 Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1885, §9, 23 Stat. 362.
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Federal court jurisdiction has since been expanded to include robbery, in-
cest, assault with a dangerous weapon, and carnal knowledge of a minor
female. 265 The current statute does not provide for either exclusive federal
jurisdiction or concurrent jurisdiction with the tribe. Given the ambiguity,
traditional Indian statutory interpretation requires that the jurisdiction be con-
current. Federal courts also have jurisdiction over federal crimes that occur on
the reservation. 266 The power of tribunal courts has also been reduced by in-
corporating state criminal law "in force at the time of the [criminal] act" into
federal law to fill gaps in federal criminal law affecting federal enclaves. 267 So-
called "status" crimes, such as bigamy, are excluded from federal jurisdiction
under the statute.
Congress and the BIA turned away from the relatively gradual
assimilative policy embodied in the Indian Reorganization Act only twenty
years after its passage. The United States returned to its efforts to abruptly
bring Indians into the dominant society with the termination policy 268 and with
Public Law 280.269 To encourage Indians to "assume their full responsibilities
as American citizens," 270 Congress terminated the tribal status of 109 tribes
and bands. 27' Terminated tribes no longer received any of the benefits required
under treaty such as annuities and federal protection of reservations. 272 Their
tribal lands were alloted individually or placed under the control of a tribal
corporation. Without a tribal land base over which to exercise jurisdiction, the
affected tribal governments collapsed. 273 Simultaneously, Congress responded
to the urgings of several western states by passing Public Law 280.274 With
Public Law 280, Congress gave these states legislative and judicial jurisdiction
over Indian lands within the states' borders. The main purpose of the act was
to provide uniformity of law to all people within a given state and to provide
adequate law enforcement on the reservation.
275
Indians brought the failings of the termination policy to Congress' atten-
26518 U.S.C. §1153 (1976).
26618 U.S.C. §13, 1152 (1976).
26718 U.S.C. §13 (1976). The Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 88 comes to mind.
268The termination policy is expressed in H. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
67 Stat. B132 (1953).
269 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
270 H. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
271 Wilkinson and Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy (1977), 5 Am.
Ind. L. Rev. 139 at 151.
272 1d. at 152-54. Termination removed two federal protections from the affected
tribes, the exemption from taxation and the restriction on tribal land alienation. These
were crucial barriers separating tribes from the marketplace and thus protecting tribal
culture. See, Clinton, supra note 258, at 1045-62. While termination denied some treaty
rights, it left intact two very important rights, hunting and fishing rights, see
Menominee Tribe v. United States, supra note 230, and water rights, see United States
v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979) appeal pending.
27 3 Supra note 271.
2 74Act of August 15, 1953 67 Stat. 588 (1953); see Goldberg, Public Law 280: The
Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians (1975), 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 535
at 537.
275 See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
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tion and the policy was ended in the 1960s. 27 6 Shortly after this, Congress gave
states the opportunity to withdraw jurisdiction over Indian country with the
Indian Civil Rights Act. 277
More importantly, the Indian Civil Rights Act imposed several constitu-
tional limitations on federal governmental action on Indian tribes. Under the
Act, Indian governments were not to interfere with religion, speech, or the
press, take property without compensation or pass bills of attainder or expost
facto laws. 278 Further, tribes were not to deny equal protection and due pro-
cess to any persons within their jurisdiction. 279 Tribes were also to follow
several United States' constitutional procedures protecting the criminally
accused.
280
United States control over Indian government occurred gradually; it is
now extensive. The United States' belief in the depravity of Indian culture led
to Congress' grant of broad power to the BIA. Indian agents ran tribal govern-
ments with the express purpose of imposing white culture; Congress removed
many Indians from tribal control by alloting tribal lands and terminating
tribes. Even as Congress acknowledged tribal self-government, it allowed the
BIA veto power over Indian constitutions, by-laws and ordinances. Congress
recognized tribal courts, only to sharply reduce their jurisdiction. Congress
and the courts accept that the Constitution gave the courts plenary power over
Indian affairs. The BIA retains great power over Indians; the BIA Commis-
sioner is still charged with "the management of all Indian affairs and of all
matters arising out of Indian relations." 281 Among other powers, the Commis-
sioner controls Indian appropriation for "the benefit, care and assistance of
the Indians. ' 282 As discussed above, the BIA vetoes tribal ordinances. Indian
276 See Goldberg, supra note 274, at 536; President's Message to Congress, H.R.
363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in Getches, Rosenfelt and Wilkinson,
Federal Indian Law, (1979) at 106-10. For several reasons, termination had failed
miserably to promote assimilation. First, most Indians did not want to become in-
dividualistic Americans and the end of federal supervision did not change their desires.
See Orfield, supra note 238, at 786-89. Second, the promoters of termination coerced
tribes into accepting termination, thus breeding alienation and resentment. Id.at 680,
691, 789. Also, no study was done of reservation conditions; the whole programme was
incredibly rushed. Hasse, Termination and Assimilation: Federal Indian Policy 1943 to
1961 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Wash. State Univ.) at 212. Last, and probably
most, racism prevented most Indians who wanted to join white society from doing so.
Id. at 2. Indians in Canada have suffered from the same racist attitudes. See Frideres,
supra note 40, at 164.
277 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §1301-26 (1976)).
27825 U.S.C. §1302 (1976).
27925 U.S.C. §1302 (8) (1976).
28025 U.S.C. §1302 (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (10) (1976). The ICRA has a marked in-
fluence on tribal courts. Besides imposing several procedures on them, it set out much
stricter eligibility requirements for judges. See 25 U.S.C. §130 (1976). Many tribal
judges of long tenure were removed for ineligibility despite their experience. National
American Indian Court Judges Assoc., Tribal Courts and the Future, ed. Getches
(Wash. D.C.: Gov't. Printing Office, 1978) at 41.
28125 U.S.C. §2 (1976).
28225 U.S.C. §13 (1976). The BIA bureaucracy is so large relative to the Indian
population (1:17) that the lion's share of congressional appropriations are lost on ad-
ministrative costs before they can reach Indians. American Indian Policy Review Com-
mission, FinalReport (1977) at 265-66. (Hereinafter cited as AIPRC.)
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alienation from a United States-type governmental system resulting in low
tribal voter turnout 283 probably helped to cement BIA control.
Recent federal legislation, however, may reduce the BIA's control. In the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Act of 1975, 2 84 declaring that
federal domination over Indians should end, Congress directed the Secretary
of the Interior, "upon the request of any Indian tribe, to enter into a contract
or contracts with any tribal organization of any such Indian tribe to plan, con-
duct, and administer programs, or portions thereof, provided in [any existing
Indian legislation] .... -285 The Secretary may only decline to contract with
the tribe if he finds that the service contracted for would not be properly pro-
vided or that tribal resources would not be protected. If he so finds, he must
state specific objections to the proposed contract and assist the tribe in over-
coming his objections and provide an appeal. The BIA's policy is to follow the
Act and become a service organization, acting according to Indian wishes.
Yet, absent Congressional action to insure that the policy of further In-
dian control of internal affairs is carried out, it appears that little will be done.
The BIA policy is to do nothing to implement the Indian Self-Determination
Act unless a tribe requests a contract. 286 The BIA will not contract with any In-
dian individual or organization absent a tribal request although the Act itself
creates no such limitation. 28 7 Further, the BIA has failed to request adequate
funding to finance. self-determination. 288 The BIA, however, has shown a
marked reluctance to surrender the degree of control over Indian government
it retains despite the clear intent of the Act.
28 9
C. State Powers Over Indian Self-Government
Congress gave states their greatest powers over Indian self-government
with Public Law 280.2 90 Under this Act, five, and later six, 291 states gained ex-
tensive criminal and some civil jurisdiction over Indian country and permitted
all other states to acquire jurisdiction at their option. 292 Some tribes success-
fully sought exemption from the Act. 293 Congress retained powers over Indian
land alienation, disposition and inheritance and excepted water rights from
state jurisdiction. 294 It also prohibited state regulations of land use and hunt-
283 De Raismes, The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit of Responsible
TribalSelf-Government (1975), 20 S. Dak. L. Rev. 59 at 69-70.
28425 U.S.C. §450 (1976).
285 25 U.S.C. §450ff. (1976).
28625 C.F.R. §271.4 (d? ,(1981).
28725 C.F.R. §271.11 (1981).
2
8Gross, Indian Self-Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Re-
cent Federal Indian Policy (1978), 56 Texas L. Rev. 1195 at 1229-30.
289 Id. at 1230-32.
29°Act ofAugust 15, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).291 The original states were Arizona, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, and
Wisconsin. Alaska was added in 1958. Act of August 8, Pub. L. No. 85-615, §1, 72
Stat. 545 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §1162(a), 25 U.S.C. §1360(a) ). Alaska became a state
in 1959.
292Act of August 15, 67 Stat. 588, 590, c. 505, §7 (repealed and re-enacted 1968)
(codified as am. by25 U.S.C. §1321-22).293 The Warm Springs tribe in Oregon successfully sought exemption from Pub. L.
No. 280. See 18 U.S.C. §1162(a), 25 U.S.C. §1360(a) (1976).
29418 U.S.C. §1162(b); 25 U.S.C. §1360(b) (1976).
[VOL. 21, NO.,3
Indian Sovereignty
ing and fishing which was inconsistent with federal law or treaty.295 Public
Law 280 was meant to promote assimilation and order by making Indians sub-
ject to the same laws as other citizens within a given state.
296
Responding to Indian criticism that they had no power over changes in
jurisdiction under Public Law 280, Congress amended the law to require tribal
consent to further state assumption of jurisdiction. 297 A majority of adult In-
dians in a tribe must now consent to state jurisdiction. 298 The amendments also
provided for state retrocession of jurisdiction to the federal government
without tribal approval. 299 This statute provides an exclusive method by which
states may acquire jurisdiction over Indian country and the procedures must
be closely followed or the transfer is invalid.
3°°
Even before Public Law 280, states had criminal jurisdiction over crimes
between non-Indians in Indian country. 301 States had no power over crimes
against Indians, except indirectly, if state law was incorporated by reference
into federal law relating to federal enclaves. 30 2 This was only legislative power;
federal courts had jurisdiction over such crimes exclusive of the state. In an
unusual application of Indian Law, the Supreme Court recently extended state
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation. Oliphant v. Su-
quamish Indian Tribe303 arose when Oliphant and his co-petitioner Belgarde,
both non-Indian residents of the Suquamish reservation in Washington, were
arraigned by a tribal court on the charge of assault of a tribal officer. One of
the alleged assaults occurred on the reservation, where the officer had tried to
arrest Belgarde on the reservation for reckless driving. The Court agreed with
Oliphant that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over a non-Indian offender
on the reservation. Rather, the federal government occupied the field. In order
to arrive at this conclusion, the court had to ignore its own rules for determin-
ing retained tribal sovereignty.
Traditionally, aspects of sovereignty not expressly surrendered by treaty
or extinguished by federal statute remain in the tribe. In addition, federal In-
dian statutes are not to be construed to the prejudice of Indians. The Court
found that the tribe had surrendered its sovereignty by making a treaty with
the United States in 1855, 304 and acknowledged that the treaty "would appear
to be silent as to tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians." 30 5 Nonethe-
less, holding that the state of protection entered by the tribe when it signed the
treaty was inconsistent with the power to try non-Indians, the Court concluded
that the tribe was to "deliver up [to non-Indian authorities] any-non-Indian of-
fender, rather than try and punish them themselves."
306
295 18 U.S.C. §1162(b); 25 U.S.C. §1360(b) (1976).
296 Supra note 275.
297 See 25 U.S.C. §1321(a), 1322(a) (1976).
29825 U.S.C. §1323(a) (1976).
29925 U.S.C. §1323(a) (1976).
300 See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
301 See e.g., New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
30218 U.S.C. §13 (1976). This is somewhat similar to the situation in Canada under
s. 88 of the Indian Act. See discussion in text accompanying notes 177-87, supra.
303435 U.S. 191 (1978).
304 Treaty of Pt. Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (1855).
305 Supra note 303, at 206.
306 Id. at 208.
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As well as ignoring well-established rules of treaty and Indian statutory
construction, 30 7 the Oliphant decision failed to acknowledge a long line of
previous decisions concerning the policy behind choice of forum which had
established that a major factor in choice of forum was the interest a forum had
in the cause of action. 30 8 The Suquamish court had a greater interest in con-
trolling non-Indian crime on the reservation than did Washington, especially
since the alleged crime was against a tribal officer enforcing reservation laws
affecting the peace and order of the community.
Time will tell if Oliphant is an aberration or a sharp change in direction
for the court. The idea that the Suquamish tribe surrendered sovereignty by
treaty-signing could easily be extended to deny Indian sovereignty altogether.
For the time being, all states have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian of-
fences on Indian territory regardless of Public Law 280. The Act states that
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts over Indian offences,
and, in some instances, certain civil matters. 3°9 Besides this, even Public Law
280 states have no control over most tribes' self-government.
D. Indian Powers of Self-Government
Many tribes have regained some powers from the federal government over
their own affairs. Congress and the BIA have determined much of the form of
that power, yet Indians have increasing control of the substance. Pursuant to
the Indian Reorganization Act, 310 most tribes vested legislative authority in a
tribal council with elected members. Tribal council powers include the ability
to determine membership, regulate family relations and probate, hire legal
counsel, make municipal-type regulations, surrender aspects of jurisdiction to
states pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act, prevent land alienation and
lease, regulate land allotment among members, control other assets, tax reser-
vation residents, negotiate with other governments and set up tribal courts.3 11
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed the broad power of tribes as
sovereign peoples to tax commercial activities and to allow the severance of
307 See text accompanying notes 168-79, supra.
308 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). A related analysis has been used in Indian cases. United States v. Wheeler,
supra note 3; Williamsv. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
The Court seems to be taking the interest of the forum into account in cases subse-
quent to Oliphant. The Court has limited the Oliphant rule of no tribal control over
non-Indians to situations in which the exercise of tribal control is either "inconsistent
with the over-riding interests of the national government," Washington v. Consolidated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 at 153 (1980), or is unnecessary
to "protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations," Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 at 558 (1981). If these stances seem contradictory it is because in re-
cent years the Supreme Court has often dealt with Indian cases as if each one stood in-
dependently of existing United States Indian caselaw. For a scathing criticism of this
practice, see Barsh and Henderson, Contrary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in
Navigable Waterways Before and After Montana v. United States (1981), 56 Wash. L.
Rev. 627.
309This follows from the principle that federal Indian statutes are construed
favourably to Indian rights. The courts have held that Public Law 280 delegates to the
States only that jurisdiction which Congress clearly intended to transfer. See Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Santa Rosa Band v. Kings County, 555 F. 2d. 655 at
663 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
31025 US.C. §461 (1976).
31125 U.S.C. §1321 et seq. (1970).
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reservation minerals by non-Indians. 312 Shortly after this decision, Congress
extended the same federal tax advantages and exemptions, as exist for states,
to tribes.
313
Many tribes do not exercise all of their powers3 14 because of the BIA
assumption of approval power over tribal ordinances. 315 The BIA can also in-
terfere with tribal government through its control of tribal trust funds316 and
its power over tribal attorney's contracts.
3 17
Most tribal governments are significantly modelled after United States'
municipal governments. The form of governmental powers is embodied in
very similar tribal constitutions which empower legislative councils and tribal
courts. 318 Tribal councils are elected; many conduct business according to
Robert's Rules of Order. 319 Many tribes have business commissions designed
to explore and encourage business development on the reservation. 320 One of
the most powerful tribes, the Navaho, has set up a Department of Justice, a
Tax Commission and an Environmental Protection Commission as well as a
Legal Aid and Defenders Department. 
321
A major area modelled after an Anglo-Saxon institution of government is
the tribal judiciary. While the degree of independence from the tribal council
varies,3 22 most tribal courts' procedures are similar to those of federal
courts.
323
Tribal courts have varying degrees of jurisdiction over cases arising on the
reservation. 324 Treaties, tribal constitutions and ordinances and federal laws
and regulations must be consulted to determine the extent of tribal court
jurisdiction on each reservation. A tribal court has civil jurisdiction on the
reservation as part of the tribe's inherent retained sovereignty, except to the
extent that a tribe has lost jurisdiction under Public Law 280 or has sur-
rendered jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act or by treaty. 325 Even
many tribes with court systems do not fully exercize this attribute of sovereign-
312 See JicarillaApache Tribe v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
313 See the Tribal Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-743, 96 Stat.
314 Indian Courts, supra note 280, at 41-42; see Gross, supra note 288, at 1230.
315 Indian Courts, supra note 280, at 41-42.
316 See Orfield, supra note 238, at 680-91.
317 See 25 U.S.C. §81-82(a) (1976).
318 See Fay, supra note 256.
319 See 25 U.S.C. §478(a) (1970).
320 See e.g., Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of the Wind River
Reservation, No. 80-1810 (10th Cir. 1982). (Tribal business council passed a reservation
zoning ordinance in part to protect the "economic benefit of the natural resources" on
the reservation.)
3212 Navajo Tribal Code §3351-3401, 3601 (1977).
322 In a survey of 33 reservations, the National Association of Indian Court Judges
found that most tribal courts had a practical, if not constitutionally-based, separation
from tribal councils; a substantial minority of tribal councils considered tribal courts an
arm of the council. Indian Courts, supra note 280, at 40.
323Id. at 35. The Pueblos of New Mexico continue to employ traditional dispute
resolution systems.
3
7AId. at 45-47. Indian Courts, supra note 280. The U.S. has sought to influence
the tribal courts' jurisdiction and approach by authorizing the BIA to write a model
code. 25 U.S.C. §1311. See 25 C.F.R. §11.33 etseq. (1981).
325 Cohen, supra note 219, at 45.
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ty. Often tribal courts waive civil jurisdiction because they are unprepared to
deal with the attendant complexities. 326 When this is done, cases go to state
courts, unless federal jurisdiction exists, or are not heard at all. It is common,
on the other hand, for tribal courts to assert a powerful tool of sovereignty,
the sovereign's immunity from suit. 327 Also, many tribes use a BIA civil
code 328 despite their power to promulgate one.
329
Tribal courts have jurisdiction over intra-Indian misdemeanors, encom-
passing lesser included offenses of the federally pre-empted major crimes.
330
Technically, tribal courts have jurisdiction over major crimes. 331 Congress has
effectively removed the tribal courts' jurisdiction by mandating a sentencing
limitation of six months' imprisonment and $500 fine and a period of work for
the tribe varying according to the crime. 332 Many tribes assert misdemeanor
jurisdiction yet follow the BIA's model code. 333 Some tribes are asserting
sovereignty by making formal extradition agreements with states. 
334
Apart from reservation government, Indians can affect federal and state
government policy affecting Indians. As in Canada, Indians have both the
federal and the state franchise and can hold public office without having to
surrender Indian status and rights.3 35 Indian lobbying is backed by votes and is
regularly effective. 336 Further, Indians may gain control over their own affairs
as a result of the BIA Indian hiring preference, 337 by reason of which some In-
dians have reached policy-making levels in the BIA.33 8 Indeed, a member of
the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, Kenneth Smith,
was named Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs in 1981.
It seems that given the recognition of Indian taxing powers and the Con-
gressional intent to reduce BIA control while increasing Indian involvement in
326 Indian Courts, supra note 280, at 47.
327Schantzv. White Lightning, 231 N.W. (2d) 812 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1975).
318Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 25 C.F.R. §11.33 (1978).
329Indian Courts, supra note 280, at 97. See also, 25 C.F.R. §11.1(e) (1982).
330The Court has held that double jeopardy does not occur because tribal and
federal courts are arms of "separate sovereigns." United States v. Wheeler, supra note
3, at 330. This principle gives tribal courts the power to perform much needed law en-
forcement on the reservation. Federal enforcement is far less than federal criminal
jurisdiction. Samuels, Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians (1980), 13
Cornell Int'l L.J. 89.
331 Tribes retain sovereignty which Congress has not removed and the Major
Crimes Act does not remove tribal court jurisdiction. See discussion in Cohen, supra
note 113, at 339-40.
33225 U.S.C. §1302(7) (1976).
333 Indian Courts, supra note 280, at 97.
334 1d. at 30-31. The United States recognizes a degree of tribal sovereignty by re-
quiring that state and federal courts give full faith and credit to tribal court acts and
proceedings in Indian child custody matters. 25 U.S.C. §1911 (Supp. III 1978).
335 8 U.S.C. §1401 (1970).
336 See e.g., Cohen, supra note 219, at 818 (referring to Restoration Acts of several
terminated tribes); Hasse, supra note 276, at 198-200.
33-25 U.S.C. §472 (1970).
338 Jackson and Galli, supra note 247. The Indian-priority-hiring law has survived
an equal protection challenge. See Morton v. Mancari, supra note 241.
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the agency, Indians should be able to substantially govern themselves on the
reservation. By taxing reservation resource extraction, Indians can fund
government, ordinance enforcement, education, and social welfare pro-
grammes. Indians can contract with the BIA for services that they are not yet
able to provide. Provided that the United States observes the terms of treaties
regarding self-government and the judicial rules of treaty construction, many
Indians could become self-regulating. Indian government would be through
United States created institutions, at least for a time, but it would be no less
self-government. 
339
Great obstacles remain to full tribal self-government. For some tribes,
Congressional action would be necessary: a revocation of the Public Law 280
grant of jurisdiction over Indians to states and restoration of the tribe. For
most of the remaining tribes, secure self-government would entail BIA ap-
proval of amendments to tribal constitutions removing BIA approval power
over tribal ordinances. Some tribes can effectively govern themselves without
major federal action so long as the BIA continues to take a hands-off ap-
proach. As the law now stands, the BIA can still greatly hinder Indian efforts
at self-government. As tribes adopt more and more American-style govern-
mental institutions, however, the BIA seems willing to permit a substantial
degree of tribal government.
V. INDIAN LAND USE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Introduction
Prior to European contact, Indians reaped the fruits of the land in diverse
ways. Some were nomadic hunters and gatherers; some farmed extensively;
still others fished a given area and gathered roots, berries and grubs to supple-
ment diet. All Indian bands or tribes had delineated territories. Various hunt-
ing bands strictly observed each others' hunting rights to given territories.
34°
Agricultural tribes, even semi-nomadic ones, possessed farmlands and con-
trolled surrounding lands as well.3 41 These tribes held farming land in common
and gave families responsibility for specific plots. While Indian land use was
similar to European use, Indians saw sharp limits on their power to exploit
land. Some lands were sacred and free from any exploitive abuse. 342 Even
when farmed, land was to be treated as gently as possible, being part of
339 The Navajo Tribal Code makes some provision for preservation of tribal custom
within the framework of a U.S.-like set of laws. It states that the code provisions are to
be interpreted in light of unwritten tribal customs. Preface, Navajo Tribal Code, I (Ox-
ford, N.H.: Equity Publishing Corp., 1920) preface.
The Navajo have recently created a Peacemaker Court based on the Navajo tradi-
tion of dispute mediation. A Navajo judge appoints a community leader to be
"peacemaker" or dispute mediator in a given community, a role held by Navajo elders
before United States dominance. (1982), V Indian Law Support Centre Report 12.
34OEggan, "Social Anthropology: Methods and Results," in SocialAnthropology
of North American Indian Tribes, supra note 219, at 523.
341 See generally, Jennings, The Invasion of America: Colonialism and the Cant of
Conquest (1975).
342E.g., Ortez, "The Tewa World View," in Tedlock, ed., Teachings from the
American Earth (New York: Liveright, 1875) at 182-84.
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Mother Earth. 343 To many Indians who did not practice agriculture, even
farming was an offence to the earth. 344
The United States did not have a policy toward Indian land use until im-
plementation of the reservation system. 345 Consistent with the nineteenth cen-
tury American ideal of the yeoman farmer, the United States fairly consistently
encouraged individual Indians on the reservation to sever plots from tribal
lands held in common and to take up farming. The United States also en-
couraged non-Indian resource exploitation. As in Canada, 346 the federal
government delegated broad discretion over Indian lands to the BIA. Similarly,
it came to control every aspect of land use, eventually leasing most arable and
mineral-rich land to non-Indians. 347 Only recently has Congress drawn in the
BIA's reins and returned some control over land use to the Indians.
348
B. Federal Powers Over Indian Lands
The federal power over Indian lands stems from the executive and con-
gressional treaty-making power 349 and the congressional power "[t]o regulate
Commerce... with the Indian Tribes. ' 350 Congress relied on the Indian Com-
merce Clause from an early time to wield an indirect yet powerful influence
over Indian lands. In its first session, Congress adopted the principles of the
Royal Proclamations of 1763351 by making non-Indian purchase of Indian
land invalid except where done pursuant to Congressional approval. 352 This ef-
fectively denied Indians the power to alienate land and was later justified by
Chief Justice Marshall as resting on the United States title by discovery in the
Indian lands inherited from the European powers. 353 Marshall found that In-
dians had a right of occupancy in lands that could not be disturbed except by
agreement between Indians and the United States.
The earliest treaties did not create a United States power to control use of
remaining Indian lands. 354 Not until the United States developed the reserva-
343 See, Clinton, supra note 258, at 1023-25.
344 The Indian prophet, Wowoka, when asked to farm, replied:
You ask me to plow the ground? Shall I take a knife and tear my mother's bosom?
Then when I die she will not take me to her bosom to rest. You ask me to dig for
stones! Shall I dig under her skins for bones? Then when I die I cannot enter her
body to be born again. You ask me to cut grass and make hay and sell it and be rich
like white men but how dare I cut my mother's hair?
Washburn, supra note 255, at 144. These attitudes have parallels among Canadian
Indians.
345 Its policy prior to that time had been to maintain peace with the Indians while
removing them from the area east of the Mississippi. Cohen, supra note 219, at 50-58.
346 See text accompanying notes 126-41, supra.
347 Jackson and Gall, supra note 247, at 91.
348 25 U.S.C. §450-450n, 476-77 (1976).
349 U.S. Const. art. II, s. 2, cl. 2.
350 U.S. Const. art. I, s. 8, cl. 3.
351 See text accompanying note 21, supra.
352 An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes of July 22, 1790,
c. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
353 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 at 573-74 (1823).
354 E.g., Treaty with the Delawares of Sept. 16, 1778, 7 Stat. 13; see Cohen, supra
note 219, at 32-48.
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tion system did it begin to bargain for control of Indian land use. 355 From this
time forward, most treaties included clauses permitting the federal government
to allot tribal lands to individual Indians. 356 These later treaties do not mention
water or mineral rights, nor do they grant power to the United States to con-
trol reservation lands.
357
The early days of the reservations saw United States efforts to encourage
farming and individual ownership among Indians.358 These efforts were largely
unsuccessful. 359 It was widely believed that Indians would never adopt civiliza-
tion without the initiative and pride of ownership that would accompany in-
dividual ownership of tribal lands. 360 Congress went far toward removing
tribal control of land use with the General Allotment Act, otherwise known as
the DawesAct.361 The DawesAct granted an allotment of 160 acres of reserva-
tion land to each family head, title to which the United States was to hold for
twenty-five years.3 62 During that period the land could not be alienated or en-
cumbered. 363 Subsequent amendments gave the Secretary of the Interior broad
discretion over leasing of alloted lands as well as issuance of fee simple title in
alloted lands. 3
64
The Dawes Act failed miserably as a civilizing measure for several
reasons.3 65 For one, it failed to take into account the importance to Indians of
tribal identity. Another and probably more important reason was Congress'
failure to supervise the BIA as it implemented the Act; the door was opened to
massive BIA control over Indian land. The various Indian agents were under
considerable pressure by white settlers to turn over the use of Indian lands to
them. 366 The BIA had been charged with determining whether an Indian was
better able to learn from farming or from observing a white lessee who already
knew the value of farming.367 Faced with this decision, Indian agents generally
355 Cohen, supra note 219, at 63-64.
356 E.g., Treaty with the Omahas of March 16, 1954, art. VI, 10 Stat. 1043.
357 Treaty with the Omahas of March 16, 1954, art. VI, 10 Stat. 1043. A few treaties
contained a broad statement about the United States' management of Indian affairs in
Indians' best interest. See text accompanying note 223, supra.
358 See Cong. Rec., 49th cong., 2d Sess., (1886) at 190 reprinted in Washburn,
supra note 251, at 1849-51.
359Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands (Norman: U of
Oklahoma Press, 1973) at 45.
360Id. at9.
361 General Allotment (or Dawes) Act of 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat. 388 codified as
amended at25 U.S.C. §331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1976).
36225 U.S.C. §5.
363 25 U.S.C. §5.
36Act of Feb. 28, 1891, c. 383, §3, 26 Stat. 794 at 795; Act of June 25, 1910,
c. 431, 36 Stat. 855. BurkeAct of May 8, 1906, c. 2348, 34 Stat. 182.
365 Otis, in his major study of the allotment policy, gives several reasons for the
allotment policy's failure including Indian's unwillingness to become independent
farmers, insufficient government training prior to allotment, insufficient funds provid-
ed to Indians for starting farm operations, pressure from land speculators, and the will-
ingness of the BIA to lease allotments to non-Indian farmers. Supra note 386, at 51,
126-31, 101-103, 141-48.
36Id. at 141-49.
367 1d. at 108.
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leased productive allotted lands to whites, paralleling the land policy of their
Canadian counterparts. Indian agents approved many Indians' applications
for fee simple to their allotments which resulted in the sale of most parcels to
non-Indians. Few Indians learned to farm as a result of the Dawes Act. Its
most significant results were the loss of'two-thirds of Indian lands and the
BIA's complete control over Indian land use. 368
Neither the Dawes Act, nor its legislative history states a constitutional
basis for Congress' power to control the manner of Indian land ownership.
369
The Supreme Court provided a theoretical basis for Congress' power in a case
involving Congressional cession of Indian lands absent Indian permission in
violation of treaty, a typical practice during the late nineteenth century. 370 The
Court held that the Indians' state of dependency at the time the later treaties
were made gave rise to a United States guardianship over Indian interests. This
guardianship was implicit in the treaties and comprehended Congress' plenary
authority over Indian affairs. This plenary power made treaty abrogation a
political question entrusted to Congress under the Constitution and
unreviewable by the Court. The Court noted that "presumably such power
will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the
government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in
the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so."
371
At first glance, the Federal Trust Doctrine, as the notion of federal guar-
dianship over Indians has come to be known, appears to be made from whole
cloth. Yet it stems from the Senate's power to ratify treaties372 and the
language of the treatiesextending federal promises of protection, education,
and annuities. 373 The idea of federal trust responsibility to Indians, therefore,
has a constitutional basis. The Court's acceptance of federal rights over tribal
affairs inherent in trusteeship, on the other hand, has no basis in the law of
trusts nor can it be tied to an enumerated Congressional power. 374 It has since
been abandoned in favour of the idea that Congress' "plenary power" over
Indian affairs stems from the Indian commerce clause, 375 an idea in keeping
with the current extensive federal power to regulate interstate commerce.
376
The courts regularly use the trust doctrine today to hold Congress and the BIA
to fiduciary standards. 377
368 Clinton, supra note 258, at 1020-22.
369 GeneralAllottment Act of 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat. 388. Some treaties authorize the
United States to allot parcels of reservation land to individual tribal members. See,
supra note 247.
370 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, supra note 239.
371 Id. at 566.
372 U.S. Const. art. II, s. 2, cl. 2.
373 See e.g., Treaty with the Sioux of 1868, art. II, VII, 15 Stat. 635, 637 (1869).
Treaty with the Cherokee of 1785, art. III, 7 Stat. 18.
374 See Maxfield, Dieterich, Trelease, Natural Resources Law on American Indian
Lands (1977) at 45-47.
375 See Morton v. Moncari, supra note 241, at 551-52.
376 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298
(1969); Katzen bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
377 See e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 at 236 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 286 at 296 (1942); United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649
F. 2d 1286 at 1309-1311 (1981).
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With the Indian Reorganization Act, 378 Congress prohibited further allot-
ment of Indian lands, thus putting a temporary end to their loss. The Act also
placed power in the tribal councils to prevent sale, encumbrance, or lease of
tribal lands. 379 Congress had come to believe that Indians required a land base
if they were to adjust to the dominant society of the United States.380 The
Dawes Act experience had shown that this adjustment for most Indians had to
be gradual if it was to come at all. This change in policy did not affect the
BIA's continued control of Indian land use through its assumption of ap-
proval power over tribal ordinances. 381 The Act's immediate impact was fur-
ther reduced because of existing twenty-year mineral leases to non-Indians ap-
proved by the BIA.
382
Some years later, Congress temporarily returned to the disposal of Indian
lands with the termination policy of the 1950s. "Termination" refers to the
termination of federal trusteeship over certain Indian tribes, accompanied by
mandatory distribution of tribal assets to tribal members and, in some cases,
disbandment of the tribe. 383 The policy was intended to remove federal control
from the Indians and to force Indians to assume "the responsibilities of
American citizenship." 3 84 This policy was applied to many fewer tribes than
was the earlier policy of allotment. 38 5 The termination policy was much more
abrupt and harsh. 38 6 The mantle of federal trusteeship was entirely removed.
The terminated tribes were no longer eligible for federal assistance; the federal
restraint on land alienation was removed. 387 The affected tribes could no
longer exercise jurisdiction over their lands because termination opened Indian
378 Supra note 249.
37925 U.S.C. §476. All tribal constitutions were to include a provision granting
tribal councils the power "to prevent the sale, dispossession, lease or encumbrance of
tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets ... ." Id.
380 Cohen, supra note 113.
381 Jackson and Galli, supra note 247, at 100.
382These leases were pursuant to Pub. L. No. 66-3, 41 Stat. 3, 31 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §399 (1976)). Oil and gas leases were to last no longer than ten
years plus the time that oil or gas was still found in paying quantities.
383 The land of smaller tribes was usually appraised and sold to the highest bidder,
with the tribe receiving the proceeds. See, AIPRC Task Force 10, Report on Terminated
Tribes (1977), at 57.
3 84 H.R. Res. 108, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 67 Stat. B122 (1953). The prime mover of
termination was Senator Watkins of Utah. He brought his deep distrust of government
and his faith in the work ethic to Indian policy. He believed that BIA supervision was
the primary reason for Indians not having fully developed reservations. Watkins was
convinced that if BIA supervision was ended, Indians would give up tribal existence and
rush to join the mainstream of United States society. Orfield, supra note 238, at 688-89.
He had little sense of Indian conditions and desires. Id. at 782. Watkins had a major im-
pact on Indian policy partly because of general Congressional disinterest in Indian af-
fairs during the termination period. Id. at 783. It is ironic that supervision and support
of the Menominee was largely transferred to the Wisconsin government, not assumed
by the tribe. After a brief interregnum, the United States resumed substantial support of
the Menominees with War on Poverty monies. Id. at 806.
385 Supra note 271.
386 For a discussion of the implementation of termination of the Menominee and its
impacts on the tribe see, Orfield, supra note 238, at 722-25.
387 See e.g., 25 U.S.C. §5640 (Klamath Termination Act), 677v (Mixed-Blood Ute
Termination Act).
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lands to the control of state laws. 388 Termination also reduced the tribal land
base, largely because of high Indian unemployment. Their lands their only asset,
many opted to sell. 389
The termination policy was applied more cautiously than the allotment
policy; about three per cent of the federally recognized Indians were
affected. 39° The policy was also brought to an end much more rapidly than the
allotment policy. Early on, many recognized that termination meant loss of In-
dian control of lands, not an Indian opportunity to enjoy the full rights and
responsibilities of United States citizenship. 39' Congress passed the last ter-
mination statute in 1962, less than ten years after creating the policy. 392 Yet,
although it has restored several tribes to their former status, most of the In-
dians affected remain "terminated" 393
The Secretary of Interior's, and thus the BIA's, authority over Indian
land use is much less extensive than in past years: the Secretary retains ap-
proval power over Indian land leases but is forbidden to lease tribal land for
mineral development without tribal permission. 394 The BIA manages non-
mineral leasing, but only at the sufferance of the affected tribe. 395 It has to ap-
prove a tribal lease unless the lease would not produce a "fair annual
rental. ' 396 As many leases are of twenty-five or ninety-nine year duration,
even an aggressive tribe may be unable to regain control over leased lands in
the near future. Most Indian lands currently under farm production are leased
by non-Indians, as are all Indian lands under mineral development. 397
The federal government retains actual control over a resource essential to
the use of most Indian lands - water. At the turn of the century, the Supreme
Court decided Winters v. United States,398 an Indian challenge to non-Indian
diversion of water upstream from a reservation. The diversion reduced flows
in a river that adjoined the reservation and which Indians used for irrigation.
The Court set forth what is now known as the Winters doctrine, holding that
the term "reservation" in Indian treaties and agreements with the United
States included not only the land but certain "reserved rights," including the
388 Id.
389 Supra note 271, at 153-54.
39°Id. at 151.
391 See Trulove & Bunting, "The Economic Impact of Federal Indian Policy: In-
centives and Responses of the Klamath Indians," reprinted in Getches, ed., supra note
276, at 15.
392Act of Sept. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-629, 76 Stat. 429 (terminating the Ponca
tribe of Nebraska).
393 See Menominee Restoration Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §903-903f); Siletz Restoration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-195,
11 Stat. 1415 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §711-7110; Oklahoma Indian Restoration Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-281, 92 Stat. 246 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §861-861c); Paiute Indian
Tribe of Utah Restoration Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-227, 94 Stat. 317 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §761-768).
39425 U.S.C. §415, §396q (1976).
395 25 U.S.C. §415, §3969 (1976). See also a discussion on BIA approval power over
tribal ordinances, text accompanying notes 252-61, supra.
39625 C.F.R., §1315(b) (1978).
397 AIPRC, FinalReport I, supra note 282, at 315.
398207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207 (1907).
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right to sufficient water to meet the purposes for which the reservation of land
was created. 399 Hence, water necessary to meet the purposes of Indian reserva-
tions was exempt from state water appropriation laws. 4° ° The Court has since
held that the date of priority for Indian water rights is the date of the in-
dividual reservation. 40 1 As reservations were generally established before non-
Indian settlement of nearby lands, Indians have priority over nearly every
other water user.
A primary purpose of Indian reservations was to convert Indians into "a
pastoral and civilized people."4°2 For this purpose, the BIA constructed water
projects on many of the arid land reservations. Most of the diverted water that
was used on the reservations, however, went to the non-Indian lessees who
were demonstrating good agriculture to Indian lessors in accordance with the
Dawes Act. 40 3 The lion's share of Indian water was sold under state prior-
appropriation law to non-Indian users in the surrounding country. 4° 4 Generally,
the Secretary of the Interior authorized water projects "without any attempt
to define, let alone protect, prior rights that Indian tribes might have had in
the water used for the projects." 4° 5 One federal agency characterized the
government development and sale of Indian water rights as "inverse condem-
nation" that had extinguished Indian rights.
406
The Supreme Court has opened the door to remedying this situation (at
least vis-A-vis Indians) by defining the Winters doctrine to include an implied
treaty reservation of sufficient water "to irrigate all of the practicably irrigable
acreage on the reservations." 407 This includes any agricultural use regardless
of the technology used. 408 The reservation purpose of assimilating or "civiliz-
ing" Indians implies that the government contemplated water use for more
than just agriculture. 409 In fact, many treaties guaranteed grist mills and other
399 Id. at 577 (U.S.), 212 (S. Ct.).
4 Id.
401Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 at 600, 83 S. Ct. 1468, at 1498 (1962). For
some purposes, notably preservation of traditional tribal activities such as hunting,
fishing and gathering the priority of reserved water rights has been found to be time im-
memorial. See United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979), appealpending.
402 Winters v. United States, supra note 398, at 576 (U.S.), 211 (S. Ct.). Reservation
purposes include enabling Indians "to make the reservation lands useful," Arizona v.
California, supra note 401, at 600 (U.S.), 1409 (S. Ct.); to preserve the Indian "way of
life," Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 at 406, 88 S. Ct. 1705,
at 1707 (1968); and to provide a "homeland for the survival and growth of the In-
dians," Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F. 2d 42 at 49, cert. denied 454
U.S. 964, 647 F. 2d 42 at 49, cert. denied454 U.S. 964.
403 Secholder v. United States, 428 F. 2d 1123, 298 F. Supp. 1282 (9th Circ.
1970), United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District, 236 F. 2d 321 (1956).
404 United States National Water Commission, Water Policy for the Future (1973)
at 474-75.
405 Id.
406 AIPRC Task Force 3, Federal Administration of Indian Affairs, (Washington:
U.S. Gov't Print. Off., 1976) at 30 (discussing statement by United States Bureau of
Reclamation).
407Arizona v. California, supra note 401, at 600 (U.S.), 1498 (S. Ct.).
408 Id. at 601 (U.S.), 1498 (S. Ct.).
409Report from Rifkind, Special Master to the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
California, supra note 430, reprinted in Cohen, supra note 407, at 592. This is the posi-
tion taken by the AIPRC, supra note 397, at 332.
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farm products processing plants to reservation Indians. 4 10 It follows that an
implied reservation of water for agricultural purposes would contemplate
water for related uses such as power generation for pumping water and milling
grain. It follows also that as Indians took their place in white society, they
would mimic the predominant white culture and develop "consumptive uses"
of water such as mining and manufacture. Even if Indian water rights were
limited to the amount necessary for "practicably irrigated lands," nothing
would prevent Indians from using a portion of that water for other develop-
ment.4 11 Nothing, that is, except lack of funds and the fact that federal action
is necessary to make Indians' theoretical water rights a reality. 412
As most tribes do not have funds for water development, the federal
government would have to take one of several steps to realize Indian water
rights. One, the United States could build several very costly additions to cur-
rent water projects, thus "creating" enough water for Indian uses. Two, it
could narrowly define "practicably irrigable acreage" and provide just enough
water for readily irrigable arable Indian land. Three, it could condemn (or
deny) the water rights of current users holding a later priority right than do In-
dians. 413 The latter seems impossible because of the drastic impact it would
have on the economy in much of the west. Non-Indians would simply not
allow it to happen.
The American Indian Policy Review Commission 414 has recommended
something between new water development and United States' condemnation
of non-Indian water rights. The Commission has called for quantification of
Indian water rights, federal aid to Indians to litigate water rights, and BIA use
of substantially more efficient irrigation systems on Indian lands. 41s President
Carter set quantification in motion and called for negotiation of priority and
quantity of Indian water rights. 416 Considering the scarcity of water in much of
the western United States, negotiation seems insufficient to protect Indian
water rights. Unless the federal government aids Indians to litigate water
410E.g., Treaty with the Shoshonees and Bannocks, 1868, 15 Stat. 673, Art III.
411 Supra note 409.
412Tribes have great difficulty raising private money for water development
because tribal trust lands cannot be mortgaged or pledged as collateral. See, Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, supra note 402.
413 The National Water Commission suggested such a programme limited to water
users who initiated water diversions after Arizona v. California, supra note 401, came
down. United States National Water Commission Final Report, supra note 404, at
480-83. A fourth possibility is to compensate tribes for the federal "taking" of Indian
water rights according to the Fifth Amendment. In the long run, this would be the
cheapest, easiest solution for the federal government. Since it would effectively kill In-
dian chances to fully develop reservations, it could be a violation of the federal trust
responsibility.
414 The American Indian Policy Review Commission was established by Congress in
1975 to study Indian concerns, desires, and conditions and report back to Congress.
The Commission had five Indian members and six members of Congress. Its full report
comprises several volumes and deals with every area of Indian social and economic con-
ditions and law. See, AIPRC, supra note 282.
415 Id. at 338.
416 Getches, ed., supra note 276, at 603-604.
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rights417 or develops Indian water projects for Indians, much Indian land will
remain largely unused. Hence, Indians will have little real choice as to land
use.
As in Canada, the United States policy toward Indian lands has been one
of federal control with little attention to Indian wishes. A little-supervised
federal agency, the BIA exercised complete control over Indian lands even
after Congress placed much of that control in the various tribes. Resource
development on Indian lands was largely for non-Indian benefit; water, if not
water rights, as well as most mining proceeds was given to non-Indians. The
policy differed from Canada's in two notable respects. First, the United States
policy makers' fascination with the Indian as yeoman farmer led to two in-
structive, though dismally unsuccessful, experiments with individual Indian
ownership of Indian lands and other assets. Second, the United States Con-
gress returned substantial Indian power over Indian lands with the Indian
Reorganization Act. It was not until recently that Congress, after much Indian
prodding, actually reduced the BIA's control, several decades after reducing
its authority.
C. State Powers Over Indian Lands
States have limited power over Indian lands largely because the United
States has generally been unwilling to relinquish control and protection of the
Indian land base. 418 The only statute giving any authority over Indian lands to
states was Public Law 280,419 passed in 1953. The law specifically exempted
"alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, in-
cluding water rights," belonging to any Indians subject to United States-
imposed restraints on alienation. 420 This exemption included all tribal lands.
Public Law 280 further limited possible state power by forbidding state
"regulation of the use of any such property in a manner inconsistent with any
federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto." 421 These limitations were consistent with the legislative purpose to
bring "law and order" to the reservation without sacrificing federal control
over most civil matters. 4
22
Public Law 280 came after the Indian Reorganization Act; Indian tribes
had the federally recognized power to regulate land use. A tribe with detailed
land use regulations at Public Law 280's passage was free of state control over
417 The federal government provides some aid in this regard. It assisted the Klamath
tribe of Oregon, for e.g., in litigating its rights to water for game preservation in United
States v. Adair, supra note 401. It provides limited support for water rights litigation
through funding for the Legal Services Corporation directed toward Indian legal ser-
vices and through the Indian Land and Natural Resources Section of the United States
Department of Justice.
418The allotment and termination periods represent notable exceptions to this
federal policy.
419 Pub. L. No. 280 (Act ofAugust 15, 1953), 67 Stat. 588.
42018 U.S.C. §1162(b), 25 U.S.C. §1322(b), 28 U.S.C. §1360(b).
421Id.
422 See Bryan v. Itasca County, supra note 275, at 389-92.
1983]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
its lands. 423 Also, any tribal land use regulation promulgated after its passage
pre-empts state land use regulation under the canon of Indian statutory con-
struction that ambiguities in Indian statutes are interpreted in favour of In-
dians. 424 In the Ninth Circuit, "encumbrances" is defined to include state
restrictions on Indian property use. 425 States, then, may only regulate tribal
land use in the absence of tribal regulations and in the far West cannot restrict
land use at all.426
D. Indian Land Use Powers
The Indians of the United States have retained fairly broad powers over
Indian lands, though many do not fully exercise their powers. 427 Tribes can
prevent land alienation and lease. 428 Tribes can regulate land allotment among
tribal members and regulate land use. 429 Armed with the presumption that a
reservation of land included all subsurface and timber rights, 430 Indians assert
a federally recognized power to regulate reservation resource development. 43'
Some tribes may make short-term leases without obtaining the Secretary's ap-
proval. 432 Several tribes have successfully sought Department of the Interior
cancellation of leases that would have created major reservation develop-
ment.4
33
As the BIA pulls back from control of Indian land, Indian land powers
can fill the vacuum. Yet the Secretary's statutory power over renewable leases
and the already granted long-term leases limit Indian control of ongoing
423 Id.
424 Id. at 392.
425 Supra note 309; Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 2d 668,
425 P. 2d 22, cert. denied 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).426 An interesting exception involves tribal regulation of non-Indian hunting and
fishing on land held in fee by non-Indians within the borders of the reservation. The
states may regulate such non-Indian use provided it does not directly affect the political
integrity, security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 at 558 (1981).
427 Tribes are often reluctant to pass land use ordinances because of the uncertainty
of BIA approval. See AIPRC, supra note 282, at 188-89.
42825 U.S.C. §415 (1976). Once land is leased, tribes have difficulty knowing
whether the BIA is enforcing the terms of the lease. The BIA regularly fails to enforce
mineral lease contracts. AIPRC, Task Force 7, Report on Reservation and Resource
Development and Protection (1977) at 139-40 [hereinafter cited as TF7].
Control over mineral development is increasingly important as mineral develop-
ment grows on mineral-rich reservations. Many tribes have agreed to mineral exploita-
tion. See e.g., Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F. 2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied
Susankewav. Kleppe, 425 U.S. 903 (1976); 47 Fed. Reg. 13, 590 (1982). (Notice of Draft
Environmental Impact Statement by Dept. of Interior for coal mining on Zuni Reserva-
tion, New Mexico.)
429 Id.; supra note 426.
430Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976). The Court here
was attempting to undo harm done by the GeneralAllotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
The Act had provided for allotment of tribal lands in fee to individual tribal members.
This practice was ceased upon passage of the Indian Reorganization Act.431 See Cohen, supra note 113, at 736.
43225 C.F.R. 172.29 (1982); 25 U.S.C. §477 (1976).
433 Supra note 235, at 579-81.
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development. 434 The BIA's primary criterion in reviewing leases for renewal-is
the maintenance of a fair return to Indian lessors, not Indian desires regarding
land uses that are unrelated to profit. 435 The Indians' lack of independent in-
formation regarding potential lessees and the effects of leasing, and the BIA's
reluctance to change its policies, will force many Indians to continue to rely on
the BIA to make leasing decisions.
436
Tribes are hampered by difficulty of access to funds. 437 This problem
forces tribes to compromise tribal priorities in exchange for funding reserva-
tion development. The story of Indian dealings with the Economic Develop-
ment Administration (EDA) is illustrative. A major priority of the EDA was to
promote development on Indian reservations. 438 Under EDA procedures, in-
itial planning for development was done by the tribal council. Plans were then
subject to an EDA determination based on priorities that Indians have had no
part in setting. 439 After that, the plan was subject to review by the state adja-
cent to or surrounding the Indian reservation. 440 So in reality, Indians, without
independent means, had to choose to develop what EDA with state consulta-
tion had decided they should develop. Often this has meant building tourist
facilities on isolated reservations, facilities that have fared poorly due to poor
planning and EDA mismanagement. 441 Contributing to the problem is the fact
that the BIA holds Indian funds in trust and regularly has not made funds
available to the tribes.
442
Indians have power over water in and adjacent to reservations sufficient
to the full development of reservation agriculture which may be used for other
development as well under the Winters doctrine.443 Indians could undertake
water impoundment and diversion projects on the reservation, but to do so
would disturb the use of downstream non-Indian users who had purchased
water rights from the United States. Western states' political leaders would
once again clamour for Indian scalps as they saw the complex system of ap-
propriative water rights partially crumble. If western appropriators were suffi-
ciently threatened, they would introduce legislation in Congress to sharply
limit Indian water rights. As Indian political strength is no match for the com-
bined power of the western states, the legislation would likely succeed, limiting
Indian development to levels far below that available to non-Indians. The
reason that such a scenario is unlikely to develop is monetary: most Indians re-
quire federal assistance to build water projects. 444 Congress need only deny ap-
434 TF7, supra note 428, at 48.
435 See 25 U.S.C. §131.5(b) (1981).
436 TF7, supra note 428, at 139-41; see Price and Weatherford, Indian Water Rights
in Theory and Practice; Navajo Experience in the Colorado River Basin (1976), 40 Law
& Contem. Prob. 105 at 116-17.
437 Tribes cannot pledge trust funds as collateral, see Colville Confederated Tribes
v. Walton, supra note 402; tribes have trouble getting at tribal trust funds controlled by
the BIA. AIPRC, supra note 282, at 359.
438 See TF7, supra note 428, at 154.
439 1d. at 155-59.
440 Supra note 406, at 43.
441 TF7, supra note 428, at 123.
442 See AIPRC, supra note 282, at 359.
443 See text accompanying notes 398-401 and 407-411, supra.
44 Supra note 276.
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propriations for water development to preserve the rights of non-Indian users,
a much cheaper (and politically safer) solution than building water projects or
buying water rights.
Political realities may force tribes to trade unspecified reserved rights for
a much smaller amount of actually delivred water. The Navajo tribe struck
such a deal in the late 1950s. As with so many other agreements, the non-
Indians have not kept their part of the bargain. Twenty years later, the Navajo
Indian Irrigation Project remains unfinished.445 The situation recaptures the
classic dilemma of this "community of strangers surrounded by a dominant,
aggressive people." 446 If Indians actively assert their rights, stronger com-
peting interests simply pass legislation to defeat those rights. No sooner do In-
dians learn the rules than the rules are changed, preserving the power of the
stronger elements of the society.
Indians have a great deal of theoretical power over tribal land use. Many
tribes regulate land use; many have substantial water rights as well as rights to
timber and subsurface resources. Tribes' real power, however, is sharply
limited. Most of the productive reservation lands are tied up in leases arranged
by the BIA. Tribes have difficulty obtaining funds for development according
to tribal priorities. The lack of funds, coupled with political weakness relative
to states and large corporations, sharply decreases tribes' power to realize their
theoretical rights to water and to control reservation land use.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a comparison of policies, this paper begins around the time of Cana-
dian Confederation, a moment that corresponds to the end of the United
States treaty-making period. By this time, most Indians in the United States
were settled on reservations. The Canadian government had yet to make
treaties with the Indians North and West of Ontario. From this time forward
each federal government would seek to assert total control over Indian self-
government and land use. The United States' move westward occurred slightly
earlier than did Canada's; the United States took control of most Indian tribes
earlier. With Indians safely placed on reservations, the United States adopted
a policy of destroying tribal culture which led to the assimilative policy ex-
pressed in allotment of Indian lands. Congress allowed the BIA a free hand in
substituting "American" for tribal culture and in carrying out the allotment
policy. By the 1880s, the BIA had total control over life on the reservation.
The Canadian federal government had made some effort to control inter-
nal Indian affairs before the 1880s by which time treaties were in place with
most native peoples. Parliament gave the DIA near-total control of Indian
government, just as the United States allotment policy began in earnest.
Parliament placed the Indian Affairs Agents at the head of band councils and,
in an apparently contradictory measure, imposed elective government on the
bands. Shortly thereafter, the Dominion government gave up most Indian
water rights by failing to seek licences for Indian uses under its new water ap-
445 See Price and Weatherford, supra note 436 for a good discussion of the Navajo
water experience and the fragility of the Winters reserved water right.
446 DeTocqueville, I Democracy in America (6th ed., H. Reeves Trans., 1879) at
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propriation law. The Canadian system of total DIA control over Indians, with
no real progress toward assimilation, was to continue through the 1960s.
Parliament then reduced DIA control by removing Agents from the band
councils but this measure did little to reduce DIA control of Indian bands.
The United States policy, on the other hand, swung sharply between
building limited Indian autonomy and rapid assimilation. The Congress
adopted a detailed statute for reduction of BIA control and a corresponding
increase in Indian autonomy with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The
Act expressed a policy of gradual assimilation by allowing Indians to organize
governments and to assume some measure of self-government if they would do
so on a government model approved by the United States. Tribal government
powers included veto power over land-use decisions. The BIA retained a large
measure of control over Indian government by writing its authority over tribes
into tribal constitutions. Twenty years after Indian reorganization, Congress
adopted termination, a policy of rapid assimilation whereby Congress ended
federal supervision over several tribes. Congress also acted to reduce federal
control at this time by giving states some jurisdiction over Indian tribes.
The late 1960s saw a return to a policy of gradual assimilation coupled
with Congressional promotion of Indian autonomy. Congress imposed United
States' civil rights protections on the tribes while ordering the BIA to permit
tribes to make contracts for services. Tribes asserted more control over reser-
vation land use, water rights, and self government; the BIA grip on the tribes
loosened.
At the same time, a Canadian Indian outcry resulted in some federal
government attention to Indian desires for control of reservation government
and land use. The Canadian policy of assimilation developed. The DIA remov-
ed its Agents from the reservation and stopped forcing the elective mode of
government on Indian bands; the DIA, within its discretion, permitted more
band control of municipal matters. While Indians have discussed and propos-
ed statutory changes, the Indian Act, and so DIA control, remains basically
unchanged.
The experiences of both nations are instructive. Until recently, Canadian
Indian policy and practice during the last century has remained fairly static.
Rigid DIA control resulted in the inability of most bands to govern themselves
even to the limited extent of a municipality. Neither Indian assimilation nor
autonomy was fostered. United States Indian policy has varied a great deal
more than Canadian during the last century and provides several enlightening
experiments. As in Canada, the United States destroyed tribal self-
government. For several decades, it did little to develop a substitute tribal
government, leaving Indians under the control of the BIA. The vacuum left by
the collapse of traditional tribal government and life styles remained unfilled
by United States government and business standards when the United States
alloted most tribal lands to individual Indians in fee. In retrospect, it is not
surprising that allotment failed. Most Indians did not want individual land
ownership. Even if they had earnestly wanted to be small farmers, they would
have had great difficulty given quality of the land, racism, and their lack of
training, business acumen, and support.
The termination policy was the United States' second experiment in rapid
assimilation. Again, the affected tribes, but for a few members, had little sense
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of life beyond the reservation. Members of tribes proposed for termination
were ill-equipped to deal with white society. The federal government had pro-
tected them from market forces and the attendant development of the work
ethic. The federal government made virtually no effort to determine Indian
desires and little effort to train Indians for becoming mainstream Americans.
When termination came, most individual shares of tribal assets were gone
within months. Termination, as did allotment, failed as an assimilation
measure.
The United States' second policy experiment of the last century was that
of self-determination. It began with the Indian Reorganization Act in the
1930s, was interrupted by the Termination Policy of the 1950s, and was resum-
ed in the 1960s, culminating to date with the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Act of 1975. A policy of self-determination failed initially because
of the degree of BIA control allowed under the Indian Reorganization Act,
although it shows signs of success under the Indian Self-Determination Act.
The Indians of the United States, at least those with intact reservations, are
making significant strides toward assimilation. This assimilation is not yet
direct. It is happening at a distance from mainstream society, taking the form
of tribal governments on a municipal BIA superintendency model, tribal
courts following United States-style codes and procedures, and increasing In-
dian exploitation, albeit through major corporations, or natural resources.
The United States experience indicates that governments must act accord-
ing to Indian desires if any policy other than one of apartheid and Indian
degradation is to succeed. It is a fundamental principle of Canadian and
American government that people should have a major voice in their destinies.
It is the tragedy of both the United States and Canadian Indian policies that
they have so rarely incorporated this principle.
So to the question, what sovereignty remains in Indians of Canada and
the United States? Unless covert Indian governments exist, Canadian Indians
retain little if any sovereignty. A minority of bands retain traditional govern-
ment methods; this power to determine the form of self-government is an at-
tribute of sovereignty. However, the Minister's control over actual decisions
makes this but a ghost of past power.
On paper, Indians in the United States who retain reservations have in-
herent retained sovereignty. The tribes determine membership and regulate
domestic relations; tribal courts have civil jurisdiction and intra-Indian misde-
meanor jurisdiction on the reservation. In large measure, they can govern
themselves. But unless the BIA ceases to review tribal ordinances and Congress
increases tribal jurisdiction these exercises of sovereignty will only constitute
practice in preparation for the eventual absorption of Indians into United
States society.
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